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I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (the “NCAA”) is a 
voluntary association that includes 1,066 colleges and universities,1 in 
which more than 430,000 students participate in intercollegiate sports.2  
The NCAA has an enforcement program that imposes severe penalties on 
member schools and student-athletes for noncompliance with NCAA 
rules, which are reflected in its manual governing Division I sports.3  
According to the manual, the primary purpose of the NCAA’s structure 
and governing rules “is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral 
part of the educational program . . .  [and] retain a clear line of demarcation 
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”4  The NCAA 
achieves this desired demarcation by requiring “student-athletes to be 
amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be 
motivated primarily by education and the physical, mental and social 
benefits to be derived.”5  Student-athletes risk their amateur status, and 
thus, their eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics if they accept 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 See About the NCAA, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
http://ncaa.org/about/who-we-are-membership)  (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
 2 Id. 
 3 National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2014-15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, 
§ 2.8.1–2.8.3, at 4 (2013), available at, http://www.ncaapublications.com/product
downloads/D115.pdf [hereinafter NCAA Div. I Manual]. 
 4 Id. § 1.3.1, at 1. 
 5 Id. § 2.9, at 4. 
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compensation for their athletic skill or performance.6  Consequently, the 
manual circumscribes all commercial opportunities available for current 
and former student-athletes. 
The Collegiate Licensing Company (the “CLC”), which serves as the 
NCAA’s licensing agent,7 facilitates the licensing and marketing of 
NCAA products to third-party enterprises. Marketing and licensing 
NCAA products comprises a “$4.6 billion retail market for collegiate 
licensed merchandise.”8  Electronic Arts, Inc. (“EA Sports”) entered into 
a six-year exclusive contract with CLC in 2005, which effectively gave 
EA Sports a monopoly for the development and distribution of NCAA 
video games.9  This contract provided EA Sports the exclusive right to 
replicate NCAA teams, stadiums, uniforms, and mascots within its NCAA 
video games.10  EA Sports derived significant commercial success from its 
NCAA video games because of its ability to portray realistic depictions of 
the various players and college teams providing a simulated experience 
similar to participating in a real college football game.11  Because EA 
Sports, pursuant to its exclusive agreement with CLC, agreed to comply 
                                                                                                                                     
 6 See id. § 12.1.2, at 59–60 (explaining amateur rules ensure that student-athletes: (1) 
do not receive benefits that could be construed as remuneration for athletics participation, 
(2) do not trade on their public standing as a student-athletes, and (3) are not exploited by 
professional or commercial interests that would abridge their status as amateurs in their 
sport). 
 7 About CLC, COLLEGIATE LICENSING CO., http://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Liron Offir, Article, Monopolistic Sleeper: How the Video Game Industry Awoke to 
Realize that Electronic Arts was Already in Charge, 8 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 91, 97 (2006); see 
also Chris Morris, EA Secures College Football Rights, CNN MONEY (Apr. 11, 2005, 9:42 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/04/11/technology/personaltech/ea_ncaa/. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Third Consol. Am. Class Action Compl. at 131, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09–
1967, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1079 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) [hereinafter Third Am. 
Compl.] (describing how EA Sports undertook significant efforts to model each digital 
avatar to mirror the respective student-athlete by matching: (1) the name of the real student-
athlete; (2) his real-life jersey number; (3) his position played; (4) his hometown; (5) his 
year of eligibility; (6) his athletic abilities (e.g., speed, strength, agility, etc); (7) his 
physical characteristics; and (8) how he dressed for games in real life); see also Third 
Consol. Am. Class Action Compl. at 89 (discussing users’ ability to download player 
names: “In the most recent versions of its games for the Sony Play Station 3, EA 
intentionally made the process of obtaining actual player names even easier by allowing 
players to share rosters online using its ‘EA Locker’ feature. The EA Locker feature allows 
gamers to upload rosters from other gamers while in the game itself. Prior to the EA Locker, 
gamers had to download rosters from a computer, upload the files to the gaming console 
and then transfer the rosters to the game. Now the gamer can obtain full NCAA rosters in 
a matter of seconds without using a computer. Furthermore, numerous websites, such as 
www.freencaa09rosters.com, keep a list of players who offer free NCAA rosters utilizing 
the EA Locker feature.”). 
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with the NCAA’s rules, EA Sports did not pay any current or former 
student-athlete for the use of his name, image, and likeness in its NCAA 
video games.12 
While technological advancements foster the consistent commercial 
expansion of college sports by creating new markets,13 the NCAA refuses 
to amend its amateur rules precluding student-athletes from sharing in this 
commercial revolution.14  The failure by the NCAA to act has led some 
former student-athletes to take legal action.15  For instance, two former 
quarterbacks, Samuel Keller and Ryan Hart, asserted individual right of 
publicity claims against EA Sports, claiming that EA Sports 
misappropriated their identity and likeness without their consent to 
enhance the commercial value of its NCAA Football video game series.16  
In both cases, EA Sports asserted First Amendment defenses, arguing that 
its video games were protected as expressive speech.17 
Courts have recognized that the First Amendment affords protection 
to numerous forms of expressive speech, including written and spoken 
                                                                                                                                     
 12 Id. at 129–30. 
 13 See Kendall K. Johnson, Article, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of 
Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 Sports Law. J. 1, 3 
(2012). 
 14 Jeffrey L. Seglin, Should Colleges Pay Athletes to Play?, THE RIGHT THING (June 
30, 2013, 11:39 AM), http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2013/06/should-colleges-pay-
athletes-to-play.html. (quoting Mark Emmert, the president of the NCAA), (“As long as 
I’m president of the NCAA, we will not pay student-athletes to play sports. Compensation 
for students is just something I’m adamantly opposed to. We’re providing athletes with 
world class educations and world class opportunities. If they are one of the few that are 
going to move on to become a pro athlete, there’s no better place in the world to refine 
their skills as a student-athlete.”).  But see Johnson, supra note 13, at 3 (criticizing the 
NCAA’s hypocrisy, which is based on “[t]he [NCAA’s] often–stated contention that it is 
protecting the players from ‘excessive commercialism’ is ludicrous; the only thing it’s 
protecting is everyone else’s revenue stream.”). 
 15 See Hart Second Am. Compl., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., (Oct. 12, 2010), ECF No. 25.; 
Keller Compl., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., (May 5, 2009), ECF No. 1. 
 16 Hart Second Am. Compl. 10-13; Keller Compl. 18. 
 17 See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[EA Sports] contends 
that the First Amendment shields it from liability for this violation because NCAA Football 
is a protected work.”); Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1272–73 (9th Cir. 2013) (“EA raises four 
affirmative defenses derived from the First Amendment: the ‘transformative use’ test, the 
Rogers test, the ‘public interest’ test, and the ‘public affairs’ exemption.”). 
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words (fact or fiction),18 biographies,19 documentaries,20 docudramas,21 
music,22 films,23 paintings,24 entertainment,25 whether or not sold for 
profit,26 and other expressive works depicting real-life figures.  In 2011, 
the United States Supreme Court determined that video games are 
protected as expressive speech under its First Amendment jurisprudence.27  
Although the First Amendment’s free speech principles protect these 
different forms and mediums of expression, such protections can be 
limited in situations where the right of free speech necessarily conflicts 
with other protected rights, such as the right of publicity.28 
In the only Supreme Court decision to address the tension between 
the right of publicity and the First Amendment, the Court held that when 
state law publicity rights conflict with First Amendment rights, courts 
must balance these competing interests.29  Because the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting. Co. did not 
establish a specific test or legal standard for resolving this conflict between 
the right of publicity and the First Amendment,30 the federal circuits have 
                                                                                                                                     
 18 See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 397 (Cal. 2001) 
(quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 869 (Cal. 1979)) 
(Bird, C.J., concurring)) (“The right of publicity derived from public prominence does not 
confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire.”). 
 19 Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439–40 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 20 Ruffin-Steinback v. DePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730–31 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 
267 F.3d 457, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 21 Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 22 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). 
 23 Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
 24 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973). 
 25 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (human cannonball 
performance). 
 26 Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 868 (1979) (Bird, C.J., 
concurring) (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967)) (“The First Amendment 
is not limited to those who publish without charge. Whether the activity involves 
newspaper publication or motion picture production, it does not lose its constitutional 
protection because it is undertaken for profit.”). 
 27 See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“[V]ideo games 
communicate ideas – and even social messages – through many familiar literary devices 
(such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the 
medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).”). 
 28 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75 (“Wherever the line in particular situations is to 
be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, [the Court] [is] 
quite sure that the First . . . Amendment[] do[es] not immunize the media when they 
broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent”). 
 29 See id. (“Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media 
reports that are protected and those that are not, [the Court] [is] quite sure that the 
First . . . Amendment[] do[es] not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s 
entire act without his consent”). 
 30 Id. 
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adopted different balancing tests to resolve the tension.  In balancing the 
tension between the right of publicity and the right to free speech, courts 
have adopted four distinct legal methodologies: (1) a case-by-case 
balancing approach; (2) the Predominant Use Test; (3) the Rogers Test; 
and (4) the Transformative Use Test.31 
This Comment analyzes the four different balancing approaches and 
the Third and Ninth Circuit’s most recent application in Hart v. Elec. Arts 
Inc.,32 and Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc.33  Specifically focusing on the video 
game context, this Comment concludes that the Transformative Use Test 
provides the most effective legal standard in resolving the tension 
underlying the right of publicity and the First Amendment.  Part II 
examines the origins of the right of publicity and its interplay with the First 
Amendment.34  Part III discusses the case law developing different 
standardized balancing tests that weigh the interests underlying the right 
to free expression against the interests in protecting the right of publicity.35  
Part IV describes why the Transformative Use Test is the proper legal 
framework in the context of video games, as well as providing the proper 
formulation and application of this balancing test.36 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE RISING 
TENSION BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
“Every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has a right 
to, but himself.”37 
Courts have increasingly recognized the evolution of the right of 
publicity as an intellectual property right that clashes with the First 
Amendment.  Part II analyzes the historical development of the right of 
publicity, as well as the fundamental tensions between the interests 
underlying the right of publicity and the First Amendment.  While Part II 
A examines the general application of the right of publicity and its 
historical origin, Part II B considers the conflicting interests underpinning 
                                                                                                                                     
 31 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959 
(10th Cir. 1996) (applying ad-hoc balancing approach); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 
S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (formulating and applying the Predominant Use Test); 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir. 1989) (formulating and applying the Rogers 
Test); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387 (Cal. 2001) 
(formulating and applying the Transformative Use Test). 
 32 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 33 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 34 See infra Part II. 
 35 See infra Part III. 
 36 See infra Part IV. 
 37 John Locke, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), available at, 
http://www.guttenberg.prg/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm. 
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the First Amendment against those underpinning the right of publicity.  
After discussing the interests underlying the tension between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment, Part II B analyzes the Supreme Court 
decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., which formally 
recognized that free speech can be constitutionally subordinated to certain 
intellectual property rights.  In the wake of Zacchini, Part II C considers 
earlier case law that reconciled the tension between the right of publicity 
and the First Amendment from an ad-hoc perspective by weighing the 
competing interests based on the facts and circumstances of each case. 
A. Origins of the Right of Publicity 
As a general rule, the right of publicity is an intellectual property 
right created by state law that protects the commercial interest in an 
individual’s cultivated identity.38  The right of publicity grants individuals 
the exclusive right to control the commercial value of their name and 
likeness, as well as to prevent others from exploiting that value without 
their consent.39  The right of publicity also recognizes the investment that 
individuals makes in developing a public image, and it prevents unjust 
enrichment by others who exploit the resulting goodwill.40 
The right of publicity evolved out of the common law right of 
privacy, which arose from the famous law review article written by 
                                                                                                                                     
 38 Thomas J. McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1.3 (2d ed. 2012); 
see Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the elements of California’s 
common law right of publicity: “To sustain this action, [a plaintiff] must prove: (1) the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or 
likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) 
resulting injury.”). 
 39 For a discussion of what constitutes an individual’s “likeness,” see Elvis Presley 
Enter. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 801 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (“To violate a plaintiff’s right of 
publicity, . . .  [] the defendant must employ an aspect of persona in a manner that 
symbolizes or identifies the plaintiff, such as the use of a name, nickname, voice, picture, 
achievements, performing style, distinctive characteristics or other indicia closely 
associated with a person.”); see also McCarthy, supra note 38, § 1.3. 
 40 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977); see Gignilliat v. 
Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, L.L.P., 385 S.C. 452, 461 (2009)  (citation omitted) (“Goodwill 
may be properly enough described to be the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an 
establishment beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed 
therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it 
receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position or common 
celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental 
circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.”). 
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Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890.41  By preventing the press 
from disseminating truthful, but yet, intrusive and embarrassing 
information, Warren and Brandeis argued that people should have a legal 
right to their privacy. 42  Warren and Brandeis were also concerned about 
famous people being able to control the commercial use of their 
photographs.43  As such, people brought right of privacy actions because 
they wanted to enjoy their right to be left alone; thus, preventing others 
from invading their privacy, injuring their feelings, or assaulting their 
peace of mind.44 
During the middle of the twentieth century, courts began recognizing 
a distinction between the personal right to be left alone and the commercial 
right to control the use of one’s identity.45  Courts found that the 
commercial nature of a person’s desire to control the use of their identity, 
not the right to be left alone was at issue.46  As a result, the concept of a 
                                                                                                                                     
 41 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890), available at, http://www.english.illinois.edu/-people-/faculty/debaron/582/
582%20readings/right%20to%20privacy.pdf. 
 42 Id. at 213–14. 
 43 Id. at 195–96 n.7. 
 44 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 1.7. 
 45 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(discussing two key distinctions between the right of publicity and the right of privacy: 
“First, the State’s interests in providing a cause of action in each instance are different. The 
interest protected in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light is clearly 
that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation. By contrast, 
the State’s interest in permitting a right of publicity is in protecting the proprietary interest 
of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment . . . . Second, the two 
torts differ in the degree to which they intrude on dissemination of information to the 
public. In [the right of privacy] cases[,] the only way to protect the interests involved is to 
attempt to minimize publication of the damaging matter, while in right of publicity cases 
the only question is who gets to do the publishing. An entertainer such as [the plaintiff] 
usually has no objection to the widespread publication of his act as long as he gets the 
commercial benefit of such publication.”); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 504 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1966) (explaining there was a “fundamental distinction between causes of action 
involving injury to feelings, sensibilities or reputation . . . , and those involving an 
appropriation of rights in the nature of property rights for commercial exploitation.”). But 
see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127, 167–78 (1993) (contending that expanded judicial and 
scholarly recognition protecting the right of publicity are not compelling). 
 46 See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.N.J. 1981) (quoting 
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967)) 
(“[A]lthough the publication of biographical data of a well-known figure does not per se 
constitute an invasion of privacy, the use of that same data (as well as the name) for the 
purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a commercial project 
other than the dissemination of news or articles or biographies does.”). 
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property right in the commercial value of a person’s identity was born.47  
No court explicitly recognized a distinct right of publicity until the Second 
Circuit’s landmark case in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc.48  Haelan involved two rival chewing gum sellers that battled 
to obtain the rights from professional baseball players to use their pictures 
on chewing gum cards.49  In resolving this dispute, the Second Circuit held 
that “in addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . , a man has 
a right in the publicity value of his photograph . . . , [which is] called a 
‘right of publicity.’”50  Even after Judge Frank’s decision in Haelan, courts 
remained reluctant to afford legal protection to the “right of publicity.”51  
Even those courts that afforded legal protection to the right of publicity, 
they often preferred other traditional labels.52 
William Prosser’s influential 1960 law review article addressed this 
tension between Judge Frank’s recognition of the right of publicity and the 
subsequent case law reluctance to adopt the label and/or concept by 
dividing the invasion of privacy tort into four separate and discrete 
categories: (1) intrusion; (2) disclosure; (3) false light; and (4) 
appropriation.53  Prosser specifically viewed the Haelan decision as 
                                                                                                                                     
 47 See McCarthy, supra note 38, §§ 1.7, 10.9 (quoting Hoffman, Limitations on the 
Right of Publicity, 28 BULL COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 111, 112 (1980)) (“It is more accurate to 
think of [the right of publicity] as a sui generis mixture of personal rights, property rights, 
and rights under unfair competition than to attempt, Proscrustean-like, to fit it precisely 
into one of those categories.”). 
 48 Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 49 Id. at 867. 
 50 See id. at 868 (discussing the scope of the “right of publicity,” Judge Frank stated: 
“For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, 
would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing 
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, 
busses, trains and subways.”). 
 51 See Strickler v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 167 F. Supp. 68, 70 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (dismissing 
the right of publicity claims, Judge Westover stated, “[t]his Court does not feel it wishes to 
blaze the trail to establish in California a cause of action based upon the right of 
publicity.”). 
 52 See Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956) (“The 
state of the law is still that of a haystack in a hurricane but certain words and phrases stick 
out. We read of the right of privacy, of invasion of property rights, of breach of contract, 
of equitable servitude, of unfair competition; and there are even suggestions of unjust 
enrichment.”); see also Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., Inc., No. 8645, 1957 WL 7316, at 
*1 (Pa. Com. Pl. June 19, 1957) (“While we do not feel it necessary to place a label upon 
the property right which the court is protecting, if we must do so, we feel that ‘right of 
publicity’ is as apt a label as any other that might be suggested . . . . This . . . is not a 
separate cause of action, but rather is unfair competition under another label.”). 
 53 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). But see Bloustein, Privacy as 
an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 
(1964) (arguing that the right of privacy protects “the individual’s independence, dignity 
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invoking the right of publicity under the label “appropriation privacy,”54  
which he recognized as a “proprietary” right “in the exclusive use of the 
plaintiff’s name and likeness as an aspect of his identity.”55  In light of 
Prosser’s article and the inconsistent development in the case law 
recognizing the right of publicity,56 states begun codifying the right of 
publicity, starting with California in 1972.57  Presently, more than half of 
the states in the United States have recognized the right of publicity by 
either statute or at common law.58 
Accordingly, the evolution and development of the right of publicity 
can no longer be ignored.  Instead, the right of publicity is now widely 
recognized as a commercial tort that prevents the unauthorized 
commercial exploitation of people’s name, likeness, voice, and 
biographical data without their consent or due compensation.59  This 
property right, however, may conflict with people’s right to freely express 
themselves under the First Amendment.  When this scenario arises, courts 
must balance the competing interests and determine whether the right of 
publicity outweighs the First Amendment interest.60   This Comment next 
considers the nature of the competing interests underlying the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment. 
                                                                                                                                     
and integrity; it defines man’s essence as a unique and self-determining being.” In other 
words, “privacy” should not be viewed as “four torts,” but as a unified concept protecting 
a fundamental aspect of human rights: human dignity). 
 54 Prosser, supra note 53, at 406. 
 55 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) (adopting Prosser’s 
four-part division of privacy rights: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the 
name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, cmt b (1995) 
[hereinafter Restatement Unfair Competition] (discussing the privacy-based appropriation 
tort as encompassing “both personal and commercial interests caused by an unauthorized 
exploitation of the plaintiff’s identity.”). 
 56 See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 n.6 (D.N.J. 1981) (citations 
omitted) (“The right of a person, whether or not termed ‘right of publicity,’ to control the 
commercial value and exploitation of his or her name and likeness has received wide 
recognition by the courts.”). 
 57 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 6.8; see also Restatement of Unfair Competition, § 46 
(listing California, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin as those states 
recognizing a statutory right of publicity). 
 58 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 6.8. 
 59 McCarthy, supra note, § 1.38. 
 60 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–79. 
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B. The Supreme Court Recognizes the Competing Interests Underlying 
the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment 
Before engaging with the different balancing tests addressing the 
conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, it is 
paramount to understand the relevant interests at stake. On the one hand, 
the right of publicity is not a right of censorship, but rather a right to 
prevent others from misappropriating the economic value generated by an 
individual’s fame through merchandising his or her name, image, or 
likeness.61  Justifications for the protecting the right of publicity fall into 
two categories; (1) economic and (2) non-economic.62 
The primary economic justification in protecting the right of 
publicity is that it presents a monetary incentive for creativity and 
achievement.63  In effect, the economic goals are thought to 
“stimulate[]athletic and artistic achievement, promoting the efficient 
allocation of resources, and protecting consumers.”64  Failing to protect 
the economic value developed in a person’s identity against commercial 
exploitation is contrary to the fundamental purpose of intellectual property 
laws, which seek to incentivize people to expend the time, effort, and 
resources necessary to develop talents that will ultimately benefit society 
due to its potential literary, artistic, political, scientific, or entertainment 
value.65  Because the right of publicity is closely analogous to other 
                                                                                                                                     
 61 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 408 (“[W]hen an artist’s skill and talent is manifestly 
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to 
commercially exploit his or her fame, then the artist’s right of free expression is outweighed 
by the right of publicity.”); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 773 (D.N.J. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“Underlying this right is the theory that a celebrity has 
the right to capitalize on his persona, and the unauthorized use of that persona for 
commercial gain violates fundamental notions of fairness and deprives the celebrity of 
some economic value in his persona.  Because celebrity status often translates to economic 
wealth, the unauthorized use of one’s persona harms the person both by diluting the value 
of the name and depriving that individual of compensation.”), rev’d on other grounds, 717 
F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 62 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th 
Cir. 1996); see also McCarthy, supra note 38, § 2.1–2.7. 
 63 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See Zacchini, 33 U.S. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)) 
(“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the 
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science 
and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards 
commensurate with the services rendered.”); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 
1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(“Intellectual property . . . provides an incentive for investment and innovation; it 
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intellectual property rights, including copyright and trademark law, 
society has an interest in affording the right of publicity similar 
protection.66  In addition, when a defendant misappropriates the likeness 
of an individual, such conduct dilutes that individual’s marketable 
identity, which has gained public recognition.67  Thus, courts protecting 
one’s right of publicity will prevent the devaluation of the commercial 
value in that person’s  identity by preventing inefficient exploitation of a 
scarce resource recognized by the economic value in one’s likeness.68 
Furthermore, the right of publicity serves to protect various non-
economic rights, including “safeguarding natural rights, securing the fruits 
of celebrity labors, preventing unjust enrichment, and averting emotional 
harm.”69  Protecting the right of publicity affords people the opportunity 
to protect their name, image, or likeness from misappropriation to the 
extent the individual expended “considerable money, time and energy” to 
develop his reputation in a particular field.70   Because the skills, 
reputation, and virtues developed by these people often take years of labor 
                                                                                                                                     
stimulates the flourishing of our culture; it protects the moral entitlements of people to the 
fruits of their labors.”). 
 66 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 401(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Zacchini, 33 U.S. at 577) (“[Copyright and patent] laws perhaps regard 
the reward to the owner [as] a secondary consideration, . . . , but they were intended 
definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights in order to afford greater encouragement to 
the production of works of benefit to the public.”). 
 67 See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437–38 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Without 
the artificial scarcity created by the protection of one’s likeness, that likeness would be 
exploited commercially until the marginal value of its use is zero.”); see also Richard A. 
Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, § 3.3, at 57 (8th ed. 2011) (“It might seem that 
creating a property right in such uses would not lead to any socially worthwhile investment 
but would simply enrich already wealthy celebrities. However, whatever information value 
a celebrity’s endorsement has to consumers will be lost if every advertiser can use the 
celebrity’s name and picture . . . . The value of associating the celebrity’s name with a 
particular product will be diminished if others are permitted to use the name in association 
with their products.”); Restatement Unfair Competition, supra note 55, § 46 cmt. c (“The 
right to prohibit unauthorized commercial exploitation of one’s identity allows a person to 
prevent harmful or excessive commercial use that may dilute the value of the identity.”). 
 68 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978). 
 69 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th 
Cir. 1996). 
 70 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 399 (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 
813, 834–35 (1979)) (Bird, C. J., concurring) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“The right of publicity, like copyright, protects a form of intellectual property 
that society deems to have some social utility. Often considerable money, time, and energy 
are needed to develop one’s prominence in a particular field. Years of labor may be 
required before one’s skill, reputation, notoriety, or virtues are sufficiently developed to 
permit an economic return through some medium of commercial promotion. For some, the 
investment may eventually create considerable commercial value in one’s identity.”). 
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to adequately develop and fine-tune,71 the right of publicity allows them 
to control and enjoy the use of their identities for commercial gain.72  Thus, 
the right of publicity prevents unjust enrichment when a defendant’s 
primary purpose of using another’s identity is to appropriate the 
commercial value of that person’s identity.73 
On the other hand, when authors or creators use another individual’s 
identity in a work, this use implicates that author’s or creator’s First 
Amendment rights.  There are several theories and policies supporting 
First Amendment protections, which include fostering a marketplace of 
ideas, encouraging human dignity and self-fulfillment, and promoting 
democratic self-governance.74  Specifically, protecting free speech under 
the First Amendment preserves an uninhibited marketplace of ideas that 
advances knowledge and the search for the truth. Such advanced 
knowledge is necessary to foster a democratic society.75  First Amendment 
protection also encourages the fundamental respect for individual 
development and self-realization.76  Because an individual’s right to self-
                                                                                                                                     
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562, 576 (“The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] 
is the straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.”); see 
also Restatement Unfair Competition, supra note 55, § 46 cmt. c (“With its emphasis on 
commercial interests, the right of publicity [] secures for plaintiffs the commercial value of 
their fame and prevents the unjust enrichment of others seeking to appropriate that value 
for themselves.”). But see Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973–74 (criticizing the incentive 
justification “because most celebrities with valuable commercial identities are already 
handsomely compensated[,]” and thus, “the commercial value of their identities is merely 
a by-product of their performance values.”); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League 
Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (downplaying the unjust 
enrichment argument because “major league baseball players are rewarded, and 
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional large sums from 
endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.”); Madow, supra note 45, at 209 (criticizing 
the attempt to analogize the right of publicity’s incentive justification with other 
intellectual property protections because “abolition of the right of publicity would leave 
entirely unimpaired a celebrity’s ability to earn a living from the activities that have 
generated his commercially marketable fame.”). 
 74 See Rodney A. Smolla, 3 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, § 2:3 (2011); 
see also McCarthy, supra note 38, §§ 7:3, 8:16, 8:18. 
 75 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will 
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be 
by the Government itself or a private licensee.”). 
 76 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also 
Procunier v. Martinez 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974), overruled on other grounds by 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (finding that the protection of free speech 
advances the needs “of the human spirit – a spirit that demands self–expression,” adding 
that “[s]uch expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of 
identity.”). 
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expression respects the individual dignity that is inherent in a democratic 
society, each speaker must be free of governmental restraint to express 
oneself.77  While there are instances where competing interests may 
challenge the fundamental protections underlying the First Amendment,78 
safeguarding the integrity of the First Amendment weighs heavily in any 
balancing inquiry.79  Because celebrities thrust themselves into the public 
domain and invite public scrutiny, “the appropriation of [a celebrity’s 
likeness] may have important uses in uninhibited debate on public 
issues,”80 and “the creative appropriation of celebrity images can be an 
important avenue of individual expression.”81  Thus, the right of publicity 
has the potential for impairing one’s First Amendment right to freely 
express oneself.82 
The Supreme Court recognized these conflicting interests in Zacchini 
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting. Co., which is the Court’s only decision 
addressing the tension between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment.83  To resolve the tension between these two competing 
interests, the Court applied a balancing test to determine whether the 
interests protected by the right of publicity outweighed the already-
                                                                                                                                     
 77 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; 
it is the essence of self–government.”). 
 78 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he First Amendment has permitted 
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,” including “obscenity, 
incitement, and fighting words.”); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 757–61 (1985) (determining that a state may allow recovery of damages in 
certain defamation cases after balancing “the State’s interest in compensating private 
individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting 
this type of expression”). 
 79 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“That books, 
newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from 
being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”). 
 80 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 397 (Cal. 2001). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3988, 
at *11 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2013) (No. 10–15387) (explaining the real-world consequences 
caused by the uncertainty created by the different balancing tests in resolving the tension 
between the First Amendment and the right of publicity: “[W]ithout th[e] [Supreme] 
Court’s guidance, artists, musicians, and other content creators will be unsure what 
standards apply to their expression and, in particular, whether the realistic depiction of real 
individuals is tortious. If the realistic portrayal of a person in an expressive work can strip 
the work of First Amendment protection, then countless creative works are at risk of 
suit . . . The effect of this uncertainty is to chill protected expression, all in the name of a 
tort with questionable underlying purposes.”). 
 83 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75. 
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existing First Amendment protections.84   In Zacchini, an Ohio television 
news program recorded and subsequently broadcast Zacchini’s entire 
“human cannonball” act from a local fair without his consent, which 
Zacchini claimed violated his right of publicity as recognized by Ohio 
law.85  Justice White, writing for the majority, held that the First 
Amendment did not protect the television station against Zacchini’s state–
law right of publicity claim.86  After balancing the right of publicity against 
the First Amendment, the Court determined that Zacchini’s economic 
interest in his performance clearly outweighed the television’s First 
Amendment defense because the television station misappropriated 
Zacchini’s entire act.87  In support of its conclusion, the Court emphasized 
that the purpose of protecting the right of publicity is to prevent unjust 
enrichment by others who exploit the resulting goodwill at the public’s 
expense.88 
Thus, Zacchini stands for two key principles: (1) the right of 
publicity is a state-law created intellectual property right that protects the 
fruits of one’s labor 89 – that is, the ability for one to commercially exploit 
his or her identity, name, or likeness – and (2) the state’s interest in 
protecting the unauthorized use of this intellectual property right is not per 
se outweighed by the interests underlying the First Amendment.90  
Nonetheless, scholars have criticized Zacchini as not being an “ordinary” 
right of publicity case because it involved the wholesale reproduction of a 
live “entire act,” which is easily distinguishable from the unauthorized use 
of a person’s identity.91  This is especially true when the unauthorized use 
is in the form of an artistic depiction of an individual.92 
                                                                                                                                     
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 563–64. 
 86 Id. at 578–79. 
 87 Id. at 574–75. 
 88 See id. at 576 (“[T]he rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the straight-
forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose 
is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have 
market value and for which he would normally pay.”). 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–75 (“Wherever the line in particular situations is to 
be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, [the Court] [is] 
quite sure that the First . . .  Amendment[] do[es] not immunize the media when they 
broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent.”). 
 91 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8:27 (recognizing that “while the Zacchini majority and 
dissenting opinions have been picked apart word by word by the commentators, no clear 
message emerges and no general rule is discernible by which to predict the result of 
conflicts between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.”). 
 92 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3988, 
at *11 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2013) (No. 10–15387) (“Zacchini offers little or no guidance in cases 
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Because Zacchini did not articulate a uniform balancing test for 
weighing the competing interests underlying the right of publicity against 
the interests underlying the First Amendment, the federal circuits were left 
to develop several balancing formulations to resolve this conflict.93  Early 
cases used an ad-hoc perspective, which balanced the relevant interests 
based on the facts and surrounding circumstances on a case-by-case basis. 
C. Post-Zacchini; Ad-Hoc Balancing Tests 
Following Zacchini, but before courts began developing more 
systematized legal balancing tests, a few federal circuits applied an ad-hoc 
balancing approach to resolve cases where the right of publicity collided 
with the First Amendment.94  Unlike trademark and copyright law, the 
right of publicity does not have a federal statutory rule to accommodate 
parody uses of a celebrity’s identity.95  Parody uses in the right of publicity 
context, therefore, must find their safe harbor in the free speech principles 
under the First Amendment.96 
In White v. Elec. Am., Inc., the Ninth Circuit balanced Samsung 
Electronics’s parodic use of Vanna White’s likeness in the commercial 
speech context.97  In that case, Vanna White, the letter-turner on the 
television game show “Wheel of Fortune,” sued Samsung for violating her 
right of publicity because Samsung published an advertisement featuring 
a costumed robot that parodied White’s persona.98  Judge Goodwin, 
writing for the majority, reversed the grant of summary judgment for 
Samsung, holding that White had produced sufficient evidence that 
Samsung’s advertisement appropriated her identity in violation of her right 
of publicity.99  Judge Kozinski, writing the dissenting opinion after a 
                                                                                                                                     
involving mere depictions of individuals, as opposed to appropriation of their actual 
performances in full.”). 
 93 See Marshall Leaffer, The Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70 
ALBANY L. REV. 1357, 1363 (2007) (“Most would acknowledge that the right of publicity 
needs to be reigned in when it burdens free expression, but no one convenient legal format 
has been found to set those limits.”). 
 94 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 959; C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. 
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 95 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2013) (describing the “fair use” doctrine under the Lanham 
Act); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2013) (describing the “fair use” doctrine under the Copyright Act). 
For a discussion explaining the First Amendment value of parodies even though they may 
conflict with intellectual property rights, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 
579–81 (1994). 
 96 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8.94. 
 97 White, 971 F.2d at 1401. 
 98 Id. at 1396. 
 99 Id. at 1398–99. 
2014] A Collision Course  191 
suggestion for rehearing en banc failed,100 strongly argued that the 
majority’s decision set forth a dangerous precedent by overprotecting the 
right of publicity when balanced against the First Amendment.101 
Contrary to White, the Tenth Circuit found the parodic use of 
another’s identity or likeness was not commercial speech, but expressive 
speech entitled to full First Amendment protection.102  In Cardtoons, L.C. 
v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., the Tenth Circuit weighed the 
First Amendment rights of a company that produced trading cards 
caricaturing and parodying well-known major league baseball players 
against a claim brought under the Oklahoma right of publicity statute.103  
Specifically, the plaintiff contracted with a political cartoonist, a sports 
artist, and a sports author and journalist to design a set of trading cards that 
featured readily identifiable caricatures of major league baseball players 
with a humorous commentary about their careers on the back.104  Finding 
the First Amendment outweighed the players’ right of publicity claims, the 
Tenth Circuit reasoned that sports and entertainment celebrities, through 
their pervasive presence in the media, symbolized certain ideas and values 
in our society, which encompassed a valuable means of expression in our 
culture.105  Under these circumstances, the Cardtoons court found that the 
card company’s parodic use of the players’ identities would not 
substantially affect their economic interests.106  As a result, the court 
concluded that the cards parodying and caricaturing celebrities were 
protected under the First Amendment.107 
                                                                                                                                     
 100 White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of 
rehearing en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 101 See id at 1513, 1516 (arguing that the majority erred because “[o]verprotecting 
intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a 
rich public domain . . . . Intellectual property rights aren’t free: They’re imposed at the 
expense of future creators and of the public at large . . . . This is why intellectual property 
law is full of careful balances between what’s set aside for the owner and what’s left in the 
public domain for the rest of us[.]”). 
 102 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (distinguishing White because “the speech involved is not commercial, but 
rather speech subject to full First Amendment protection.”). For a discussion examining 
the scope of commercial speech, see Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1017 
(3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (“[T]hree factors to consider in deciding whether speech 
is commercial: (1) is the speech an advertisement; (2) does the speech refer to a specific 
product or service; and (3) does the speaker have an economic motivation for the speech.”). 
 103 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970–76. 
 104 Id. at 962. 
 105 Id. at 972. 
 106 See id. at 973–74 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590–
91 1994)) (“Parody . . . rarely acts as a market substitute for the original”). 
 107 Id. at 973–76. 
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Furthermore, courts have found that interests underlying the First 
Amendment may outweigh interests underlying the right of publicity when 
the disputed expression is a matter of “public interest.”108  In the fantasy 
sports context, the Eighth Circuit balanced the right of publicity of major 
league baseball players against the First Amendment rights to use the 
players’ identities in a pay-to-play Internet fantasy baseball game.109  The 
plaintiff, a provider of fantasy baseball games, sought a declaratory 
judgment to establish its right to use, without a license, the baseball 
players’s names and statistics in connection with its fantasy baseball 
products.110  The issue before the court in C.B.C. Distribution and 
Marketing, Inc. v. Major Legal Baseball Advance Media, L.P., was 
whether the owner of a fantasy baseball product had the right to use 
publicly available information without a license from the players.111  In 
holding that the plaintiff’s First Amendment right trumped the players’ 
right of publicity, Judge Arnold, writing for the majority, reasoned that the 
“recitation and discussion of factual data concerning the athletic 
performance of [players on Major League Baseball’s website] 
command[ed] a substantial public interest.”112  The Eighth Circuit also 
                                                                                                                                     
 108 See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), (holding First 
Amendment outweighed the right of publicity, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that “the 
information used in CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all readily available in the public 
domain, and it would be strange law that a person would not have a first amendment right 
to use information that is available to everyone.”); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 
440–41 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that because “[the plaintiff] became a public figure through 
his activities[,]” and because “[t]he subject matter of his statements – narcotics officers 
using drugs, perjuring themselves, and making fraudulent charges – was a matter of public 
interest[,]” the defendant could use these activities); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal. 
App. 4th 536, 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the surfing documentary was afforded 
protection under the First Amendment); Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. 
App. 4th 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that “[p]osters portraying the 49’ers’ victories 
are . . . a form of public interest presentation to which protection must be extended.”); 
Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 411 (Cal Ct. App. 2001) 
(finding “[t]he recitation and discussion of factual data concerning the athletic performance 
of these plaintiffs command a substantial public interest, and, therefore, is a form of 
expression due substantial constitutional protection.”). But see Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In 
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1283 n.12 
(9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing C.B.C. because EA Sports not only uses publicly available 
information, but it also “uses virtual likenesses of actual college football players.”); Hart 
v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165 n.37 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding “[t]he presence of a 
digital avatar that recreates [the celebrity] in a digital medium differentiates this matter 
from C.B.C.”). 
 109 C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 820. 
 110 Id. at  820–21. 
 111 Id. at 823. 
 112 Id. at 823–24 (quoting Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 
411 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
2014] A Collision Course  193 
noted that the major league baseball players’ economic interests were not 
implicated because “players are rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their 
participation in games and can earn additional large sums from 
endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.”113  Thus, the C.B.C. 
majority found the plaintiff enjoyed a First Amendment right to use the 
players’ names and playing records.114 
While these cases approached the tension between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment based on the surrounding facts and 
circumstances of each case, other courts have attacked this issue through 
more methodological frameworks.  Part III examines these more 
standardized balancing tests and seeks to determine whether any of them 
provide a more compelling legal framework in weighing the competing 
interests in the context of video games. 
III. THE MODERN BALANCING TESTS; FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF 
APPEALS APPLYING SYSTEMATIC ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Zacchini set the stage for the development of more systematic 
balancing tests when determining whether the interest in safeguarding the 
right of publicity outweighs the interest in safeguarding the right to free 
expression.115  Specifically, there are three balancing tests that courts have 
applied in weighing the tension between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment: (1) the Predominant Use Test; (2) the Rogers Test; and (3) 
the Transformative Use Test.  Although most courts have declined to adopt 
the Predominant Use Test, commentators have weighed in on the test’s 
usefulness and its appropriate application.116  Rather, most courts have 
                                                                                                                                     
 113 Id. at 824. But see Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) 
((“We reject as inapplicable in this case the suggestion that those who play organized sports 
are not significantly damaged by appropriation of their likeness because ‘players are 
rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional 
large sums from endorsement and sponsorship arrangements . . . ’ If anything, the policy 
considerations in this case weigh in favor of [the college football players]. As we have 
already noted, intercollegiate athletes are forbidden from capitalizing on their fame while 
in school. Moreover, the NCAA most recently estimated that ‘[l]ess than one in 100, or 1.6 
percent, of NCAA senior football players will get drafted by a National Football League 
(NFL) team.’”)(citations omitted)). 
 114 Id. at 824. 
 115 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 152–53 (“In the wake of Zacchini, courts began applying a 
balancing inquiry to resolve cases where a right of publicity claim collided with First 
Amendment protections.”). 
 116 See, e.g., William Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs: Games and the Right of 
Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2012); Andrew Beckerman-
Rodau, Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An Argument for the Convergence of the Right 
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adopted either the trademark-based Rogers Test or the copyright-based 
Transformative Use Test in resolving the conflict between the competing 
interests.  While Part III A examines the application of the Predominant 
Use Test, Part III B analyzes the development and application of the 
Rogers Test.  Part III C and C (i) discusses the Transformative Use Test 
and its application in the video game context.  Finally, Part III C (ii) 
analyzes the Transformative Use Test’s most recent application in suits 
brought by former college football players against EA Sports’s NCAA 
Football video game series.  After analyzing the different methodologies 
in balancing the right of publicity and the First Amendment, this Comment 
contends that the Transformative Use Test is the proper balancing 
framework that should be applied in the context of video games. 
A. Predominant Use Test 
The application of the Predominant Use Test has appeared only in 
Doe v. TCI Cablevision,117 where the Missouri Supreme Court considered 
a former professional hockey player’s right of publicity claim against a 
comic book publishing company.  Specifically, Anthony “Tony” Twist 
sued a number of individuals and entities involved in producing and 
publishing the Spawn comic book series after the introduction of a 
villainous character named Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli.118  The 
comic book creators asserted a First Amendment defense, arguing that the 
use of Twist’s identity in their comic books constituted expressive speech 
protected under the First Amendment.119  In balancing Twist’s property 
interests in his own name and identity against the First Amendment 
interests of the comic book creators, the TCI court rejected both the 
Transformative Use and Rogers tests, finding that the tests gave “too little 
consideration to the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity 
have both expressive and commercial components.”120  Furthermore, 
Judge Linbaugh, writing for a unanimous court, found that both tests were 
too rigid, emphasizing that they operated “to preclude a cause of action 
whenever the use of the name and identity is in any way expressive, 
                                                                                                                                     
of Publicity, Unfair Competition and Trademark Law, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 132 (2012); Joseph Gutmann, Note, It’s In the Game: Redefining the 
Transformative Use Test for the Video Game Arena, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 
(2012). 
 117 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 118 Id. at 365. 
 119 Id. at 367. 
 120 Id. at 374. 
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regardless of its commercial exploitation.”121  Instead, the TCI court 
applied a two-prong test, which it called “a sort of predominant use test”: 
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity, that product should 
be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the 
First Amendment, even if there is some ‘expressive’ content in it 
that might qualify as ‘speech’ in other circumstances. If, on the 
other hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an 
expressive comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values 
could be given greater weight.122 
After applying the Predominant Use Test, the court ruled for Twist, 
holding that the commercial value of using Twist’s identity trumped the 
literary value expressed in the comic book.123  The Missouri Supreme 
Court found that the comic book creators used Twist’s name and identity 
“to attract attention to their product;” thus, attempting to obtain a 
commercial advantage for their comic book and related merchandise 
among hockey fans.124 
Because applying the Predominant Use Test in balancing the relevant 
interests underlying the right of publicity and the First Amendment may 
chill expressive speech,125 the Missouri Supreme Court is the only court to 
adopt this balancing test.126 
B. The Rogers Test 
Various courts and commentators have contended that claims 
asserting the right of publicity are akin to trademark claims under the 
Lanham Act because both claims require courts to balance the interest in 
protecting the relevant intellectual property rights against the interest in 
                                                                                                                                     
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right 
of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003)). 
 123 Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374. 
 124 Id. at 372; see id. at 374 (concluding “the use and identity of Twist’s name has 
become predominantly a ploy to sell comic books and related products rather than an 
artistic or literary expression, and under these circumstances, free speech must give way to 
the right of publicity.”). 
 125 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]s a necessary 
(and insidious) consequence, [Hart’s] approach would suppose that there exists a broad 
range of seemingly expressive speech that has no First Amendment value.”). 
 126 See Jordan M. Blanke, No Doubt About It – You’ve Got To Have Hart: Simulation 
Video Games May Redefine The Balance Between And Among The Right of Publicity, The 
First Amendment, and Copyright Law, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 63 (2013) (“[S]ome 
courts have tried the transformative test, some the Rogers test, and one the ‘predominant 
use’ test.”). 
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free expression.127  Courts have determined that the application of the 
Rogers Test makes sense “in the context of commercial speech when the 
appropriation of a celebrity’s likeness creates a false and misleading 
impression that the celebrity is endorsing a product.”128  The test arose in 
the Second Circuit decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi,129 where Ginger Rogers 
sued the producers and distributors of the film entitled, “Ginger and Fred,” 
alleging that the title infringed Rogers’s right of publicity and confused 
consumers in violation of the Lanham Act.130  In analyzing the right of 
publicity claim under Oregon law,131 the Second Circuit articulated the 
Rogers Test by holding that a celebrity’s name may be used in a movie 
title unless the title was (1) “wholly unrelated” to the movie or (2) the title 
was “simply a disguised commercial advertisement for sale of goods or 
services.”132  After applying the Rogers two-prong test, the Second Circuit 
denied Rogers’s right of publicity claim because the title was related to the 
content of the movie and was not a disguised advertisement for a 
commercial product.133 
Other federal circuits have expanded the application of the Rogers 
Test in the context of other expressive works under the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition.134  Under the Restatement approach, the 
                                                                                                                                     
 127 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Bruce P. Keller, The Right of Publicity: Past, Present, and Future, 1207 PLI Corp. Law & 
Prac. Handbook 159, 170 (2000)) (noting that “a Lanham Act false endorsement claim is 
the federal equivalent of the right of publicity”). 
 128 ETW, 332 F.3d at 956 (Clay, J., dissenting) (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. 
Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 396 (Cal. 2001)). 
 129 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 130 Id. at 997. 
 131 See id. at 1002 (noting that because “right of publicity claims are governed by the 
substantive law of the plaintiff’s domicile[,]” and because “Rogers is an Oregon 
domiciliary,” the Second Circuit found “Oregon law governs [her] [right of publicity] 
claim.”). 
 132 Id. at 1004 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. 
Supp. 2d 757, 790 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th 
Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013 (“This ‘wholly unrelated’ 
and ‘disguised commercial advertisement’ language is strikingly similar to the Lanham Act 
relatedness test, but comes from a distinct body of law. Ultimately, it is not clear from [the 
Court’s] reading of [the] Rogers’ language whether it disposed of the right of publicity 
claim on state law, as opposed to federal constitutional grounds, but other courts have read 
Rogers as resting on federal constitutional grounds.”). 
 133 Id. at 1004–05. But see Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 
2008) (Ambro., J.) (discussing the scope of the Rogers Test, the Third Circuit, in dicta, 
expressed doubt over whether the Rogers Test could apply beyond the title of a work by 
emphasizing that only a few other courts had done so). 
 134 See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Matthews v. 
Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell 
Publishing Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the Rogers Test is not 
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use of a person’s identity does not violate their right of publicity when the 
purpose of such use involves communicating information or expressing 
ideas, such as in news, entertainment, or creative works.135  By contrast, 
the Restatement notes that the right of publicity trumps a First Amendment 
defense if the unauthorized use of the person’s identity was “solely to 
attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified [person].”136 
The Fifth Circuit applied this broader application of the Rogers Test 
in Matthews v. Wozencraft,137 which considered whether a fictional novel 
incorporating events from the life of an undercover narcotics officer 
violated the officer’s right of publicity.138  In articulating the legal standard 
for the right of publicity claim, the Fifth Circuit noted that it was irrelevant 
“whether [the book] [was] viewed as a[] historical or [] fictional work, so 
long as it [was] not simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the 
sale of goods or services.”139  Because the court found that the book was 
not a commercial advertisement, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff 
had to show that the defendant acted with actual malice, which 
encompassed a “reckless disregard for the truth” to establish his right of 
publicity claim.140  When applying this actual malice standard, the 
Matthews court ruled for the defendant because the plaintiff voluntarily 
interviewed with the media and the subject matter of his statements were 
a matter of public interest.141 
The Sixth Circuit also applied the Restatement’s extension of the 
Rogers Test in Parks v. LaFace Records,142 where it considered whether a 
rap song entitled “Rosa Parks” infringed the famous Civil Rights icon’s 
                                                                                                                                     
limited to literary titles but is generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of 
artistic expression.”); accord ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 n.11 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (The Rogers Test is “generally applicable to all cases involving literary or 
artistic works where the defendant has articulated a colorable claim that the use of a 
celebrity’s identity is protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 135 Restatement Unfair Competition, supra note 55, § 47; see id. § 47 cmt. c (“Use of 
another’s identity in a novel, play, or motion picture is . . . not ordinarily an infringement 
[of the right of publicity] . . . ”). 
 136 Id. § 47 cmt. c. 
 137 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 138 Matthews, 15 F.3d at 439–40. 
 139 Id. at 440 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140 Id. Contra Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 156 & 156 n.20 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis in applying the actual malice standard because “[i]n Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co . . . . , as standing for the proposition that the actual malice standard does 
not apply to the tort of appropriation of a right of publicity.”). 
 141 Mathews, 15 F.3d at 440–41. 
 142 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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right of publicity.143  Applying the expanded Rogers test, Judge Holschuh, 
writing for a unanimous court, concluded that there was an issue of 
material fact as to whether the title of the song was “wholly unrelated” to 
the lyrics because a reasonable finder of fact “could find the title to be a 
disguised commercial advertisement or adopted solely to attract attention 
to the work.144 
Although some federal circuits have applied the Rogers Test in 
balancing the tension between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment,145 most federal circuits have relied on the Transformative 
Use Test. 
C. The Transformative Use Test 
The California Supreme Court constructed the Transformative Use 
Test after finding that elements of the copyright “fair use” doctrine most 
appropriately balanced the competing interests underlying the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment.146  Generally, works containing 
“significant transformative elements” are less likely to interfere with the 
                                                                                                                                     
 143 Id. at 441–42. 
 144 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But see, Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 
141, 157 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding “Parks to be less than persuasive given that just over a 
month later another panel of the Sixth Circuit decided ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 
a right of publicity case where the [Sixth] Circuit applied the Transformative Use Test.”) 
(citation omitted); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268, 1281 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting the Sixth Circuit in Parks is 
“only circuit court to import the Rogers test into the publicity arena, . . . [and] has done so 
inconsistently.”). 
 145 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F. 3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the 
Rogers Test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment outweighed any risk 
of confusion between Mattel and the song title)Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday 
Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 146 See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404–05 (Cal. 
2001); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citing 
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[W]hether the new work merely 
supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, [], or instead adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
transformative.”). While the California Supreme Court rejected wholesale importation of 
the entire Copyright “fair use” defense, it did make key use of the transformative part of 
the fair use analysis, see Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00-3802, 2001 WL 
1111970, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Although post-Campbell, courts have been neither 
consistent nor expositive in the interpretation and application of ‘transformative,’ it is now 
established that uses which merely copy, repackage, republish, substitute for, encapsulate 
or appropriate the essence of the copyrighted material are not transformative; whereas uses 
which ‘employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the 
original’ are transformative.”). 
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economic interests implicated by the right of publicity.147  The Ninth 
Circuit has noted that two California Supreme Court decisions “bookend 
the spectrum” of the Transformative Use Test.148 
At one end of the spectrum, the California Supreme Court discussed 
a clear example of a non-transformative use in Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. 
Gary Saderup, Inc.149  Comedy III addressed whether the First Amendment 
protected an artist’s production and sale of t-shirts and prints bearing a 
charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges.150  Judge Mosk, writing for a 
unanimous court, found that the first “fair use” factor from copyright law, 
“the purpose and character of the use,” properly balanced the competing 
interests between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.151 
While articulating the Transformative Use Test, Judge Mosk held 
that the balance between the right of publicity and First Amendment 
interests turns on the following five factors, which includes whether: 
(1) the celebrity likeness is one of the raw materials from which an 
original work is synthesized or the depiction or imitation of the celebrity 
is the very sum and substance of the work in question; (2) the work is 
primarily the defendant’s own expression, if the expression is something 
other than the likeness of the celebrity; (3) the literal and imitative or 
creative elements predominate in the work; (4) the marketability and 
economic value of the challenged work derives primarily from the fame 
of the celebrity depicted; and (5) an artist’s skill and talent has been 
manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional 
portrait of a celebrity so as to commercially exploit the celebrity’s fame.152 
The California Supreme Court carefully noted, however, that 
transformative or creative elements were not confined to parodic uses,153 
but may also include factual reporting and fictionalized portrayal, all 
ranging from heavy-handed lampooning to subtle social 
                                                                                                                                     
 147 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 405 (citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996)) (explaining “works of parody or other 
distortions of the celebrity figure are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good 
substitutes for conventional depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not generally 
threaten markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to 
protect.”). 
 148 See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 890 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 149 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 393. 
 150 Id. at 393. 
 151 Id. at 404–05. 
 152 See id. at 406–08; see also McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8:72 (discussing the five-
factor Transformative Use Test). 
 153 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406. 
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criticism.154  Thus, a defendant may assert a First Amendment affirmative 
defense under the Transformative Use Test so long as the artistic visual 
depiction of the celebrity contains “significant transformative elements” 
or the economic value of the challenged work does not primarily derive 
from the fame of the celebrity depicted.155  Applying the Transformative 
Use Test, Judge Mosk ruled that the artist’s charcoal portraits violated the 
Three Stooges’s right of publicity.156  The Court found that the defendant’s 
creative contribution was subordinated to the overall goal of creating a 
literal image of the Three Stooges to commercially exploit their fame.157 
A few years later, the California Supreme Court revisited the 
Transformative Use Test in Winter v. DC Comics,158 which illustrated a 
use that was highly transformative.  Two musicians, Johnny and Edgar 
Winter, who both possessed long white hair and albino features, brought 
suit against DC Comics over images of two villainous half-man, half-
worm creatures, both with long white hair and albino features, named 
Johnny and Edgar Autumn.159  Applying the Transformative Use Test, 
Judge Chin, writing for a unanimous court, held that the Winter brothers’ 
claim were barred by the First Amendment as a matter of law.160  In finding 
that the comic depictions at issue “depict[ed] fanciful, creative 
characters,”161 the California Supreme Court reasoned that the First 
Amendment protected these depictions because the characters were 
“distorted for purposes of lampoon, parody, or caricature.”162  Thus, the 
Winter court found that DC Comics’ work would not greatly threaten the 
commercial value of the Winter brothers’ likenesses because their fans 
“would find the drawings of the Autumn brothers [in the accused’s comic 
book] unsatisfactory as a substitute for conventional depictions.”163 
                                                                                                                                     
 154 See id. at 407 (citations omitted) (“The inquiry is in a sense more quantitative than 
qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements predominate 
in the work.”). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 408–09. 
 157 Id. at 409. 
 158 30 Cal. 4th 881 (Cal. 2003). 
 159 Id. at 886. 
 160 Id. at 890–92. 
 161 Id. at 892. 
 162 Id. at 891; see also Ross v. Roberts, 282 Cal. App. 4th 677, 687-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2013) (holding that while “[the defendant] made music out of fictional tales of dealing 
drugs and other exploits – some of which related to [the] plaintiff[,] . . . [the defendant] 
created original artistic works” protected under the First Amendment). 
 163 Winter, 30 Cal. 4th at 890–91; see id. at 891 (citations omitted) (internal citation 
omitted) ((“The question is whether the work is transformative, not how it is marketed. If 
the work is sufficiently transformative to receive legal protection, it is of no moment that 
the advertisements may have increased the profitability of the [work]. If the challenged 
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Although Comedy III and Winter bookend the spectrum of cases 
applying the Transformative Use Test, most cases fall somewhere in the 
middle of the Transformative Use Test jurisprudence because they not 
only focus on the use of peoples’ identities, but also add a transformative 
element to the work.164  For instance, in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards,165 the 
Ninth Circuit applied the Transformative Use Test to a Hallmark greeting 
card that depicted Paris Hilton in a manner reminiscent of an episode of 
Hilton’s reality show, The Simple Life, and quoted her famous statement, 
“that’s hot.”166  While comparing Hallmark’s card to the video game in 
Kirby v. Sega America, Inc,167 the Ninth Circuit found the greeting card 
did not contain the degree of “significant transformative elements” added 
to the video game because the game transported a 1990s singer into the 
25th century and transformed her into an entirely new character as space-
age news reporter.168  Accordingly, the Hilton court ruled that Hallmark’s 
greeting card depicting Paris Hilton’s head on a cartoon waitress 
accompanied by the line “that’s hot” was not transformative and thus, 
infringed Hilton’s right of publicity.169 
One month after the Parks decision,170 the Sixth Circuit revisited the 
tension between the right of publicity and the right to free speech in ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc.,171 which focused on a photograph of Tiger 
Woods set among a collage of other, golf-related photographs.172  
Although ETW mentioned both Parks and its application of the Rogers 
Test under the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,173 the Sixth 
Circuit did not apply the Rogers Test to the Ohio right of publicity claim 
at issue.  Instead, the balancing test the Sixth Circuit ultimately applied 
was a combination of an ad-hoc approach and the Transformative Use 
                                                                                                                                     
work is transformative, the way it is advertised cannot somehow make it non-
transformative.”) (citations omitted)). 
 164 See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2009); ETW Corp. v. 
Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 165 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 166 Id. at 899. 
 167 See Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see 
also infra notes 197–202. 
 168 Hilton, 599 F.3d at 899. 
 169 See id. at 911 (“While a work need not be phantasmagoric as in Winter or fanciful 
as in Kirby in order to be transformative, there is enough doubt as to whether Hallmark’s 
card is transformative under our case law that we cannot say Hallmark is entitled to the 
defense . . . ”). 
 170 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 171 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 172 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 173 Id. at 936 n.17. 
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Test.174  In analogizing the collage of Tiger Woods prints with the Three 
Stooges portraits from Comedy III, Judge Graham, writing for the 
majority, held that the collage was sufficiently transformative because it 
“d[id] not capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods.”175  The 
majority afforded First Amendment protection based on the creative 
elements found in the “panorama” of Woods’s historic 1997 victory at the 
world-famous Masters Tournament.176  The “panorama” conveyed a 
message about the significance of Woods’s achievement through images 
suggesting that Woods would eventually join the ranks of the world’s best 
golfers.177  Thus, the defendant transformed Woods’s identity by adding 
significant creative elements that made it “less likely to interfere with the 
economic interest protected by [his] right of publicity.”178 
Judge Clay, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the ETW majority for 
its disjointed analysis in balancing Woods’s economic interest in his 
identity against the defendant’s First Amendment interest in the 
painting.179  Although Judge Clay agreed that the Transformative Use Test 
was appropriate in this case, he disagreed with the majority’s 
application.180  Applying the Transformative Use Test, the dissent found 
the defendant’s work did not contain significant transformative 
elements.181  Favoring Tiger Woods, Judge Clay found that the disputed 
images “gain[ed] their commercial value by exploiting the fame and 
celebrity status that Woods ha[d] worked to achieve.”182 
In sum, the Transformative Use Test jurisprudence includes a 
spectrum of works that transform the subject work at issue – turning on 
whether and how the celebrity’s identity is transformed.183  At one end of 
the spectrum, the California Supreme Court found in Comedy III that the 
drawings of the Three Stooges were mere literal depictions of celebrities 
recreated in a different medium of expression.184  At the other end of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 174 See id. at 937–38 (illustrating the ETW majority’s two part analysis applying a 
balancing test from comment d in the Restatement analyzing “the substantiality and market 
effect of the use of the celebrity’s image . . . in light of the informational and creative 
content[,]” as well as the Transformative Use Test). 
 175 Id. at 938. 
 176 Id. at 936. 
 177 ETW, 332 F.3d at 938. 
 178 Id.; see also Moore v. Weinstein Co., LLC, 545 Fed. App’x. 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(analogizing ETW, the Sixth Circuit held “the [m]ovie added significant expressive 
elements to any purported use of [the Plaintiff’s] identity.”). 
 179 ETW, 332 F.3d at 951 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 180 Id. at 951–52. 
 181 Id. at 959–60. 
 182 Id. at 960. 
 183 McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8:72. 
 184 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 409 (Cal. 2001). 
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spectrum, the Winter court found significant creative elements when the 
publisher the created fanciful characters in a fanciful setting in his comic 
book that drew inspiration from celebrities.185  Most cases, however, fall 
somewhere in between the two California Supreme Court decisions, such 
as Hilton and ETW.  Part III C (i) examines some of these other middle-
ground cases applying the Transformative Use Test in the context of video 
games. 
i. The Transformative Use Test and Video Games 
Video games are expressive works entitled to as much First 
Amendment protection as the most profound literature and 
entertainment.186  The California Court of Appeal decided two cases 
applying the Transformative Use Test to video games. 187   They are 
particularly instructive regarding the Third and Ninth Circuit’s 
dispositions in resolving the former college football players’ claims 
against EA Sports’ First Amendment defenses.  In Kirby v. Sega of 
America, Inc.,188 the court applied the Transformative Use Test in a case 
involving the musician, Kierin Kirby, who claimed that Sega of America, 
Inc.’s (“Sega”) video game misappropriated her likeness and signature 
phrases for purposes of creating the character of Ulala.189  In applying the 
Transformative Use Test, the court noted that, on the one hand, not only 
did Kirby’s signature phrases included “ooh la la,”190 but that both she and 
Ulala would often use phrases like “groove,” “meow,” “dee-lish,” and “I 
won’t give up.”191  On the other hand, the court noted that differences did 
exist between the two characters, such as Ulala’s physique, primary 
hairstyle, costumes, and dance moves.192  After comparing and contrasting 
the two characters, the Kirby court ruled in Sega’s favor, rejecting Kirby’s 
argument that the differences between her and Ulala added no additional 
                                                                                                                                     
 185 Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 891 (Cal. 2003). 
 186 See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“Like the 
protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas – 
and even social messages – through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, 
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the 
player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment 
protection.”). 
 187 See e.g., Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); 
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 188 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (Bolan, J). 
 189 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 52–53. 
 190 Id. at 56. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
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meaning or message to the work because it was clear that that Ulala was 
not a mere digital recreation of Kirby.193 
Five years later, the California Court of Appeal in No Doubt v. 
Activision Publishing, Inc., again addressed a right of publicity claim in 
the context of video games.194  No Doubt revolved around the video game 
“Band Hero,” which allowed players to simulate performing in a rock 
band.195  By choosing from a number of playable characters, known as 
“avatars,” players could be a guitarist, a singer, or a drummer.196  Some of 
the avatars were digital recreations of real-life musicians, including 
members of the band No Doubt.197  After a contract dispute broke off 
relations between the band and the company, No Doubt sued, claiming 
Activision violated their right of publicity.198 
Applying the Transformative Use Test, the California Court of 
Appeal held Activision’s use of No Doubt’s likeness was not sufficiently 
transformative because the avatars were precisely computer-generated 
reproductions of the band members that did not meld with the other 
elements of the game to become Activision’s own artistic expression.199  
Distinguishing Kirby and Winter, Judge Willhite, writing for the majority, 
noted that unlike the “fanciful creative characters” in the earlier cases, the 
No Doubt avatars could not be altered by players, and thus, remained “at 
all times immutable images of the real celebrity musicians.”200  This fact 
by itself, however, did not end the court’s application of the 
Transformative Use Test because “even literal reproductions of celebrities 
can be ‘transformed’ into expressive works based on the context into 
which the celebrity image is placed.”201  While finding no additional 
transformative elements, the court emphasized that the No Doubt 
characters were performing the same activity, rock songs, in which the 
band attained and maintained its fame.202  Even though the surrounding 
elements in the video game contained creative elements, Judge Willhite 
found that these creative elements failed to “transform the avatars into 
                                                                                                                                     
 193 Id. at 59–60. 
 194 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 195 No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 401. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 402. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 411–12. 
 200 No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410. 
 201 See id. (citing Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 409) (noting, for example, the Andy Warhol 
silkscreens featuring celebrity portraits of Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth Taylor, and Elvis 
Presley, through “careful manipulation of context,” convey an ironic message about the 
“dehumanization of celebrity” through reproductions of celebrity images). 
 202 Id. at 410–11. 
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anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing 
exactly what they do as celebrities.”203 
In the wake of these two California Court of Appeal decisions, the 
Third and Ninth Circuit considered essentially two identical video game 
cases addressing whether the right of publicity of a former college football 
player outweighed the First Amendment right of a video game developer 
to use his likeness in its games.204 
ii. The Transformative Use Test; EA Sports’s NCAA Football 
Video Game Series 
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,205 presented a case of first impression for the 
Third Circuit.  Ryan Hart, a former Rutgers quarterback, filed suit against 
EA Sports alleging a violation of his right of publicity under the common 
law of New Jersey.206  Specifically, the crux of Hart’s argument was that 
EA Sports allegedly misappropriated his identity, such as his likeness and 
biographical information, for commercial use in its NCAA Football video 
game series without his consent.207  After analyzing the Predominant Use 
Test, the Rogers Test, and the Transformative Use Test, the Third Circuit 
determined that the Transformative Use Test struck the proper balance in 
reconciling the tension underlying the interests protected by the right of 
publicity and afforded by the First Amendment in the video game 
context.208 
In formulating the proper application of the Transformative Use Test, 
Judge Greenaway, writing for the majority, undertook a step-by-step 
                                                                                                                                     
 203 See id. at 411(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding “the 
graphics and other background content of the game are secondary, and the expressive 
elements of the game remain manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a 
conventional portrait of [No Doubt] so as to commercially exploit [its] fame.”); see also 
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (The Ninth Circuit considered 
a Hallmark card featuring Paris Hilton’s head on a cartoon waitress’s body was not a 
“transformative use” because the “basic setting” was the same as an episode of Hilton’s 
television show in which she was depicted as “born to privilege, working as a waitress”). 
 204 See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 149–52 (3d Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec. 
Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 205 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 151–52 (“Since neither the New Jersey courts nor our own 
circuit have set out a definitive methodology for balancing the tension between the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity, we are presented with a case of first impression.”). 
 206 Id. at 145. 
 207 Id. at 147 & n.8 (“[Hart] alleges  that the physical attributes exhibited by the virtual 
avatar in NCAA Football are his own (i.e., he attended high school in Florida, measures 
6’2” tall, weighs 197 pounds, wears number 13, and has the same left wrist band and helmet 
visor) and that the avatar’s speed, agility, and passer rating reflected actual footage of 
[Hart] during his tenure at Rutgers.”). 
 208 Id. at 165. 
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analysis in determining whether Hart’s identity was sufficiently 
transformed in EA Sports’s NCAA Football video game series: 
(1) Whether [Hart]’s ‘identity’ [was] sufficiently transformed in 
NCAA Football; (2) how [Hart’s] identity [was] incorporated into 
and transformed by NCAA Football; (3) whether the type and 
extent of interactivity permitted is sufficient to transform [Hart’s] 
likeness into [EA Sports’s] own expression.209 
Applying this three-step formulation of the Transformative Use Test, 
the Third Circuit ruled in favor of Hart’s right of publicity claim, holding 
that EA Sports’s NCAA Football video game series did not sufficiently 
transform Hart’s identity.210  To the extent users were able to alter Hart’s 
and other college football players’s avatar appearances, Judge Greenaway 
found that this interactive feature alone could not satisfy the 
Transformative Use Test.211  Moreover, the Hart majority noted that the 
other creative elements featured in NCAA Football, including the feature 
that allowed users to alter the avatar’s appearance, were deemed “wholly 
unrelated elements” under the Transformative Use Test because they did 
not affect how Hart’s identity was used or altered when playing the 
game.212  Judge Greenaway reasoned that because the players’ unaltered 
likenesses were an essential element to the user’s game experience, the 
Third Circuit was disinclined to credit such a game feature as a 
transformative use. 
Although agreeing with the Hart majority that the Transformative 
Use Test provided the proper balancing test for resolving the conflict 
between the right of publicity and First Amendment, Judge Ambro, in 
dissent, disagreed with the majority’s formulation and application of the 
test.213  First, Judge Ambro contended that the majority erroneously 
formulated the Transformative Use Test because it narrowly focused on 
                                                                                                                                     
 209 Id. at 165–67 (noting the term “identity” in the video game context includes the 
combination of Hart’s likeness and biographical information). 
 210 Id. at 169. 
 211 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 167 (“If the mere presence of the feature were enough, video 
game companies could commit the most blatant acts of misappropriation only to absolve 
themselves by including a feature that allows users to modify the digital likenesses.”); see 
also id. at 168–69 (finding “[i]n the first instance, the relationship between these assets and 
the digital avatar is predicated on the users’ desire to alter the avatar’s appearance, 
which . . .  is insufficient to satisfy the Test.”). 
 212 Id. at 169 (“Decisions applying the Transformative Use Test invariably look to how 
the celebrity’s identity is used in or is altered by other aspects of a work . . . .  [T]his inquiry 
was aimed at determining whether this context acted upon the celebrity identity in a way 
that transformed it or imbued it with some added creativity beyond providing a ‘merely 
trivial variation.’”). 
 213 Id. at 170–71 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
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“Hart’s identity alone, disregarding other features of the work.”214  Rather, 
Judge Ambro argued that the proper focus of the test examines “the 
context of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing only on the 
individual’s likeness.”215  Second, the dissent argued that the majority 
misapplied the Transformative Use Test, finding EA Sports’s First 
Amendment right outweighed Hart’s right of publicity claim.216  
Specifically, Judge Ambro found that NCAA Football, in its totality, 
contained significant creative elements based on its “original graphics, 
videos, sound effects, and game scenarios[,]” which allowed users to direct 
how they want to play the game.217  Furthermore, Judge Ambro 
emphasized that even if users select not to alter the characteristics of the 
players’ avatars, the combination of the other creative elements are still 
sufficiently transformative.218  Accordingly, the dissent found that the 
video game contained “significant transformative elements” as a whole, 
thereby concluding that EA Sports’s First Amendment defense trumped 
Hart’s right of publicity claim.219 
Similarly, in Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., the issue before the Ninth 
Circuit was whether, for purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion under Cal. 
Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1), EA Sports’s First Amendment defense 
outweighed Samuel Keller’s right of publicity claim.220  Keller, as part of 
a putative class-action complaint filed in the Northern District of 
California, asserted that EA Sports violated his right of publicity under 
California Civil Code § 3344 and California common law by using his 
likeness in its NCAA Football video game series.221  Applying the 
                                                                                                                                     
 214 Id. at 171–73 (explaining “a narrow focus on an individual’s likeness, rather than 
how that likeness is incorporated into and transformed by the work as a whole, is a flawed 
formulation of the transformative inquiry. The whole . . . is the better baseline for that 
inquiry.”). 
 215 Id at 171–72 (finding that the proper formulation of the Transformative Use Test 
“examine[s] the creative work in the aggregate to determine whether it satisfies the 
Transformative Use Test and merits First Amendment protection.”). 
 216 Id. at 175 
 217 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. (“Any attempt to separate these elements from the use of Hart’s likeness 
disregards NCAA Football’s many expressive features beyond an avatar having 
characteristics similar to Hart. His likeness is transformed by the artistry necessary to create 
a digitally rendered avatar within the imaginative and interactive world EA has placed that 
avatar.”). 
 220 724 F.3d 1268, 1272–73 (9th Cir. 2013) (“California’s anti-strategic lawsuit against 
public participation (SLAPP) statute is designed to discourage suits that masquerade as 
ordinary lawsuits but are brought to deter common citizens from exercising their political 
or legal rights or to punish them for doing so.”). 
 221 Id. 
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Transformative Use Test, the Ninth Circuit held that EA Sports’s use of 
Keller’s likeness in its video game did not sufficiently transform Keller’s 
identity because “it literally recreate[d] Keller in the very setting in which 
he has achieved renown.”222  In reaching this conclusion, Judge Bybee, on 
behalf of the majority, agreed with Judge Greenaway’s analysis in Hart,223 
discounting the user’s ability to alter the avatar’s appearance.224 
Judge Thomas, who agreed with Judge Ambro’s dissenting opinion 
in Hart,225 also disagreed with the majority’s formulation and application 
of the Transformative Use Test.226  According to Judge Thomas, the proper 
formulation examines “whether the transformative and creative elements 
of a particular work predominate over commercially based literal or 
imitative depictions.”227  The dissent asserted that such an inquiry involves 
a two-step process, which first considers the creative work at issue, and 
then balances these creative elements against the publicity right at stake.228  
In applying this two-step test, Judge Thomas found that the creative 
elements in EA Sports’s video games were sufficiently transformative,229 
“both from a quantitative and qualitative perspective.”230  Thus, the dissent 
concluded that the First Amendment protected EA Sports’s NCAA 
Football video game series.231 
                                                                                                                                     
 222 Id. at 1271; see also Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 911(9th Cir. 2009) 
(applying anti-SLAPP statute to the transformative use test the court concluded “that the 
card falls far short of the level of new expression . . . [,] [in which] there is enough doubt 
as to whether Hallmark’s card is transformative under [Ninth Circuit] case law that [the 
panel] cannot say Hallmark is entitled to the defense as a matter of law.”). 
 223 Id. at 1278–79 (“Like the majority in Hart, [the Ninth Circuit] rel[ies] substantially 
on No Doubt, and believe[d] [it was] [] correct to do so.”). 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. at 724 F.3d 1268, 1285 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 226 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (“[B]ecause excessive deconstruction of Comedy III can 
lead to misapplication of the test[,] . . . it is at this juncture that I must respectfully part 
ways with my colleagues in the majority.”). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 1285–87. 
 229 Id. at 1286 (“The athletic likenesses are but one of the raw materials from which the 
broader game is constructed[;] [t]he work, considered as a whole, is primarily one of EA’s 
own expression[;] [t]he creative and transformative elements predominate over the 
commercial use of likenesses[;] [t]he marketability and economic value of the game comes 
from the creative elements within, not from the pure commercial exploitation of a celebrity 
image[;] [and] [t]he game is not a conventional portrait of a celebrity, but a work consisting 
of many creative and transformative elements.”). 
 230 Id. at 1287–88 (“As a quantitative matter, NCAA Football is different from other 
right of publicity cases in the sheer number of virtual actors involved” because “NCAA 
Football includes not just Sam Keller, but thousands of virtual actors[,]” and thus, [t]he 
sheer quantity of the virtual players in the game underscores the inappropriateness of 
analyzing the right of publicity through the lens of one likeness only.”); see also id. at 1288 
(“As a qualitative matter, the essence of NCAA Football is founded on publicly available 
data, which is not protected by any individual publicity rights.”). 
 231 Id at 1286. 
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In short, when balancing the interest that the right of publicity 
protects against those interests that the First Amendment protects, the 
Third and Ninth Circuits agreed that the methodology set forth by the 
Transformative Use Test strikes the best balance.  Panels within the Third 
and Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed as to the proper formulation and 
application of the Transformative Use Test in the video game context.  Part 
IV addresses these two concerns, as well as justifying why the 
Transformative Use Test provides the best balancing framework when 
weighing the interests between the right of publicity and First Amendment 
in the video game context. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This Comment contends that in the context of video games the most 
effective analytical framework among varying mythologies for balancing 
the right of publicity and the First Amendment is the Transformative Use 
Test. Part IV A compares and contrasts the three different analytical 
balancing tests, demonstrating that the Transformative Use Test is the 
most refined test when applied to video games. Part IV B discusses why 
the majority opinions’ in Hart and Keller properly applied the 
Transformative Use Test, whereas adopting the dissenting opinions’ 
analyses would turn the right of publicity on its head.  More specifically, 
while Part IV B (i) examines the proper formulation of the Transformative 
Use Test in the video game context, Part IV B (ii) analyzes the test’s 
correct application. 
A. The Transformative Use Test is the Proper Analytical Framework for 
Balancing the Tension between the First Amendment and the Right of 
Publicity 
After analyzing the Predominant Use Test, the Rogers Test, and the 
Transformative Use Test, Judge Greenaway correctly determined that the 
Transformative Use Test is the proper balancing framework for resolving 
the conflict between the First Amendment and the right of publicity when 
applied to video games.232  First, with respect to the Predominant Use Test, 
                                                                                                                                     
 232 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165 (3d Cir. 2013). But see, David Tan, 
Political Recoding of the Contemporary Celebrity and the First Amendment, 2 HARV. J. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 25–26 (2011) (criticizing courts for adopting the Transformative Use 
Test because it “can encourage judges to be art critics or base decisions on external factors 
like the fame of the artist . . . . In addition, the cryptic judicial comments that literal 
depictions like Andy Warhol’s silkscreens of celebrities may also be transformative if they 
carry a particular social message lend little guidance to how a court may meaningfully 
determine what constitutes the criteria for transformative use.  As shown by recent 
California decisions, the test is focused on visual transformation which can be 
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the Third Circuit and commentators correctly noted that the application of 
the test overprotects the right of publicity.233  Initially, the TCI court 
conceded that the Predominant Use Test is particularly for “cases where 
speech is both expressive and commercial.”234  As such, the Predominant 
Use Test, rather than focusing on expression, examines the product sold 
and whether it predominantly exploits the commercial value of the 
celebrity’s identity.235 
Although a consideration under the Transformative Use Test is 
whether the “marketability and economic value of the challenged work 
derive primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted,”236 the 
                                                                                                                                     
overprotective of art and entertainment that contribute little to the discussion of public 
issues, but underprotective of political speech which may be contextually transformative 
(because of its recoding) though not visually transformative.”); E. Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 916 (2003) (criticizing the 
Transformative Use Test as uncertain and unpredictable); F.J. Dougherty, All the World’s 
Not a Stooge: The ‘Transformativeness’ Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to 
a Right of Publicity Claim against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 Colum. J. L. & ARTS 
1, 73 (2003) (“A better test that would be less vague and would be more effective in 
protection valuable First Amendment [i]nterests would permit the sale of image copies – 
that is, any artwork or photograph portraying an individual in the form of prints, posters, 
lithographs or other mere reproductions – without regard to their artistic quality, while 
prohibiting sale of unrelated image merchandise, such as T-shirts, buttons or cups, that 
embody such a work.  In other words, it would be better for judges to determine what is 
unrelated merchandise than to determine whether a given image work is good enough to 
qualify as speech.”); McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8.72 (commenting that the California 
Supreme Court’s formulation of the Transformative Use Test “will unfortunately prove 
extremely difficult to predict and apply because it requires a court to make an aesthetic 
judgment about the challenged artistic use[,]” and thus, “th[e] transformative test is 
subjective in application, unpredictable in outcome and fraught with ambiguity.”). 
 233 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 154; see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb 
on the Constitutional Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights, 50 B.C. L. REV. 
1503, 1512 (2009) (discussing the “‘Transformative Use’ approach is certainly more 
speech-protective than the Supreme Court of Missouri’s ‘predominant use’ test, in part 
because California does not count a defendant’s intent to gain a marketing advantage from 
the use against him if he contributes sufficient input of his own.”). 
 234 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis 
added). 
 235 Id. at 374. 
 236 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 407; see also Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 
889 (Cal. 2003) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“If it is determined 
that a work is worthy of First Amendment protection because added creative elements 
significantly transform the celebrity depiction, then independent inquiry into whether or 
not that work is cutting into the market for the celebrity’s images . . . appears to be 
irrelevant . . . . [E]ven if the work’s marketability and economic value derive primarily 
from the fame of the celebrity depicted, the work may still be transformative and entitled 
to First Amendment protection. However, if the marketability and economic value of the 
challenged work do not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame, there would generally 
be no actionable right of publicity. When the value of the work comes principally from 
some source other than the fame of the celebrity – from the creativity, skill, and reputation 
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California Supreme Court importantly emphasized that this is merely a 
secondary consideration to be analyzed only in close cases.237  Because it 
is undisputed that video games constitute expressive speech, and not 
commercial speech under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence,238 the only logical conclusion is that the Predominant Use 
Test is unfit for a balancing test that requires calibrated balancing between 
two fundamental and competing interests.  In addition, the subjective 
nature of the Predominant Use Test is problematic because it may put 
courts in a dangerous and unfamiliar position of “call[ing] upon judges to 
act as both impartial jurists and discerning art critics[,]” two roles that 
cannot co-exist.239  Given the limited inquiry of the Predominant Use Test 
focusing not on the creative elements of an artist’s expression, but rather 
on the expressive value of the celebrity’s identity, it is likely that such 
focus will result in suppressing valuable expressive speech.240  Thus, 
applying the Predominant Use Test in the video game context does not 
sufficiently weigh the underlying interests protected by the First 
Amendment. 
Unlike the Predominant Use Test, applying the Transformative Use 
Test provides a more effective balancing approach because it “requires a 
more circumscribed inquiry” that will require courts to recognize the 
fundamental protections afforded to the First Amendment by “focusing on 
the specific aspects of a work that speak to whether it was merely created 
                                                                                                                                     
of the artist – it may be presumed that sufficient transformative elements are present to 
warrant First Amendment protection.”). 
 237 Id.; see also Hart, 717 F.3d at 163 n.29 (“The court in Comedy III rightly recognized 
that the balancing inquiry suggested by the Supreme Court in Zacchini cannot start and 
stop with commercial purpose or value.”). 
 238 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 239 Hart, 717 F.3d at 154 (“Adopting [the Predominant Use Test] would be tantamount 
to admitting that it is proper for courts to analyze select elements of a work to determine 
how much they contribute to the entire work’s expressiveness.”). But see Keller v. Elec. 
Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 3988, at *13 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2013) (No. 10–15387) (arguing the Third and Ninth 
Circuit’s holdings that “the depiction of a person’s image or likeness in an expressive work 
enjoys First Amendment protection against a right-of-publicity claim only if the depiction 
sufficiently alters or “transforms” the plaintiff’s image or likeness” will result in “chill[ing] 
expression, both because it is hard to predict what a court will decide is sufficiently 
‘transformative,’ and because such an inquiry inevitably requires a court to make a 
subjective judgment about whether a depiction is “artistic,” thus warranting protection, or 
‘literal,’ and thus subject to liability.”); McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8.72 (explaining that 
the “transformative’ test is subjective in application, unpredictable in outcome and fraught 
with ambiguity.”). 
 240 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; see also id. at 154 (positing that a consequence of the 
Predominant Use Test “would suppose that there exists a broad range of seemingly 
expressive speech that has no First Amendment value.”). 
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to exploit a celebrity’s likeness.”241  Furthermore, contrary to the 
Predominant Use Test, which merely evaluates the expressive “value” of 
a celebrity’s identity,242 Hart’s formulation of the Transformative Use Test 
evaluated not only the expressive “value” of Hart’s likeness, but also the 
use of Hart’s identity in the context of EA Sports’s NCAA Football video 
game series.243  Accordingly, the failure of the Predominant Use Test to 
examine how other creative elements in the work affect the celebrity’s 
identity will likely chill expressive speech that United States Constitution 
protects. 
Second, with respect to the Rogers Test, the Third and Ninth Circuits, 
as well as commentators have properly found the test unfit for carefully 
calibrated balancing between the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity because the trademark-based test overprotects the First 
Amendment.244  As an initial matter, the Third Circuit appropriately agreed 
with the Second Circuit in Rogers that the right of publicity is broader than 
trademark protection.245  The Rogers test was intended to be used in 
trademark-like right of publicity cases under the Lanham Act,246 but the 
                                                                                                                                     
 241 Id. at 163 
 242 See Doe, 110 S.W. 3d at 374 (rejecting the Transformative Use Test because it 
operates “to preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the name and identity is in any 
way expressive, regardless of its commercial exploitation.”). 
 243 Hart, 717 F.3d at 164 n.30 (“[T]he Predominant Use Test . . . merely looks to the 
expressive ‘value’ of a celebrity’s identity, not its use, vis-à-vis the challenged work.”). 
 244 Id. at 155–57 (“Adopting [the Rogers Test] would potentially immunize a broad 
swath of tortious activity.”); see also Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1280 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (emphasis added)  (“EA argues that we should extend this test, created to 
evaluate Lanham Act claims, to apply to right-of-publicity claims because it is ‘less prone 
to misinterpretation’ and ‘more protective of free expression’ than the transformative use 
defense.”); Joseph Gutmann, Note, It’s In the Game: Redefining the Transformative Use 
Test for the Video Game Arena, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 220 (2012) (“A work 
can be a complete imitation even if there is no explicit deception present in it. These works, 
despite having little to no redeeming creative value on their own would still unquestionably 
pass the Rogers Test.”). 
 245 Hart, 717 F.3d at 155 n.19 (citations omitted); see also id. at 159 (“[W]hile the 
Rogers Test was arguably forged in the crucible of trademark law – and the Rogers court 
appeared to consult trademark principles for inspiration –  the court also pointed out that 
the right of publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no likelihood of confusion requirement 
and is therefore potentially more expansive than the Lanham Act . . . . [T]he right of 
publicity is broader and, by extension, protects a greater swath of property interests.”); see 
also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1281 (“Keller’s publicity claim is not founded on an allegation that 
consumers are being illegally misled into believing that he is endorsing EA or its 
products[,] [but] [i]nstead, Keller’s claim is that EA has appropriated, without permission 
and without providing compensation, his talent and years of hard work on the football 
field.”); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 967 (“Although publicity rights are related to laws 
preventing false endorsement, they offer substantially broader protection.”). 
 246 Hart, 717 F.3d at 157 (“While the [Rogers] Test may have a use in trademark–like 
right of publicity cases, it is inapposite here.”); see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1280 
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common law right of publicity does not implicate consumer confusion.247  
Thus, because the Rogers Test focuses on whether an artistic or literary 
work explicitly misleads consumers,248 and because the right of publicity 
protects the property and economic interests of the celebrity, not the 
consumer,249 the Rogers Test fails to properly weigh celebrities’ 
commercial rights in their identities.250  Accordingly, Judge Greenaway 
properly decided not “to adopt a test that hews so closely to traditional 
trademark principles.”251 
Contrary to the Rogers Test, the Transformative Use Test provides a 
more effective methodology because it “maintains a singular focus on 
whether the work sufficiently transforms the celebrity’s identity or 
likeness.”252  Specifically, the Transformative Use Test’s incorporation of 
copyright’s fair use doctrine properly balances the extent of a defendant’s 
use of a celebrity’s image against the years of hard work the celebrity 
expended in developing his or her marketable identity.253  As a result, this 
singular focus analysis properly allows courts to consider “the fact that 
misappropriation can occur in any market segment, including those related 
to the celebrity” without overreaching by seeking to protect consumers 
from the risk of consumer deception, which is adequately protected by 
trademark law.254  Accordingly, the Transformative Use Test captures the 
                                                                                                                                     
(“Although . . . there is some overlap between the transformative use test formulated by 
the California Supreme Court and the Rogers test, [the Ninth Circuit] disagree[s] that the 
Rogers test should be imported wholesale for right-of-publicity claims.”). 
 247 Hart, 717 F.3d at 158; accord Keller, 724 F.3d  at 1280 (citations omitted) 
(disagreeing “that the Rogers Test should be imported wholesale for right-of-publicity 
claims[,]” which is “consistent with the Third Circuit’s rejection of EA’s identical 
argument in Hart. As the history and development of the Rogers test makes clear, it was 
designed to protect consumers from the risk of consumer confusion – the hallmark element 
of a Lanham Act claim[,] [whereas] [t]he right of publicity . . . does not primarily seek to 
prevent consumer confusion.”); see also Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[A] right of 
publicity claim does differ from a false advertising claim in one crucial respect; a right of 
publicity claim does not require any evidence that a consumer is likely to be confused.”). 
 248 Hart, 717 F.3d at 158; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1280. 
 249 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1281. 
 250 See id. at 1280 (citing Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 399) (discussing the purpose behind 
the legal protection afforded to the right of publicity since it “primarily protects a form of 
intellectual property [in one’s person] that society deems to have some social utility.”). 
 251 Hart, 717 F.3d at 158. 
 252 Id. at 163. 
 253 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 777 (D.N.J. 2011), rev’d on other 
grounds, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 254 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013); see also id. at 157–58 
(disagreeing with EA Sport’s argument “that [Hart] should be unable to assert a claim for 
appropriating his likeness as a football player precisely because his likeness was used for 
a game about football[,]” because . . . ”[a]dopting this line of reasoning threatens to turn 
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intricacies necessary to determine whether a challenged work contains the 
creative elements entitled to First Amendment protection or merely an 
attempt to misappropriate the economic value generated by a celebrity’s 
fame without due compensation. 
Because the Third and Ninth Circuits correctly found that the 
Transformative Use Test is the proper balancing framework for resolving 
the tension underlying the competing interests between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment in the context of video games, Part IV 
B turns to the test’s proper formulation and application. 
B. Both Majority Opinions in Hart and Keller Properly Formulated and 
Applied the Transformative Use Test 
i. Formulation of the Transformative Use Test 
Before analyzing the proper application of the Transformative Use 
Test, it is first necessary to determine the proper formulation of the test in 
the video game context.  Specifically, the majority and dissenting opinions 
in Hart and Keller noted that the threshold issue is whether the 
Transformative Use Test considers the other creative elements in the video 
game that do not affect or alter the celebrity’s likeness.255  Because the 
Transformative Use Test does focus on whether an individual’s likeness 
was sufficiently transformed in the creative work as a whole, the primary 
focus of this inquiry is the magnitude of how the celebrity’s identity is 
transformed in the entire work.256  Thus, the test neither focuses on the 
                                                                                                                                     
the right of publicity on its head.” The Third Circuit additionally noted that “[i]t cannot be 
that the very activity by which [the celebrity] achieved his renown now prevents him from 
protecting his hard–won celebrity.”); see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1281 (“The right of 
publicity protects the celebrity, not the consumer.”). 
 255 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (“Decisions applying the Transformative Use Test invariably 
look to how the celebrity’s identity is used in or is altered by other aspects of a work.”); 
see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1273 (citation omitted) (“The transformative use defense . . .  is 
a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether 
the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed into 
something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”). 
 256 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (emphasis in original) (“Decisions applying the 
Transformative Use Test invariably look to how the celebrity’s identity is used in or is 
altered by other aspects of a work.”); see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279 n.10 (citation 
omitted) (“[O]ne of the factors identified in Comedy III requires an examination of whether 
a likely purchaser’s primary motivation is to buy a reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy 
the expressive work of that artist.”); McCarthy, supra note 46, § 8.27 (“When the accused 
work is a story-telling vehicle, . . . the issue is whether the overall ‘personality’ of the 
plaintiff has been transformed as it appears in the accused work. Thus, the accused work 
must be analyzed as a whole, taking into account not only the visual image, but also the 
personality of the accused depiction in the context of the accused work as a whole, 
including the story line.”). 
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“creative work in the aggregate,”257 nor examines whether the creative 
elements “predominate” the work as a whole,258 if the other creative 
elements do not affect the context upon which the celebrity’s identity is 
altered.259 
Judge Ambro’s dissent in Hart argued that the California Supreme 
Court’s application of the Transformative Use Test in Comedy III and 
Winter showed that the inquiry must focus on how a celebrity’s “likeness 
is incorporated into and transformed by the work as a whole[.]”260  In this 
regard, Judge Ambro contends that if the work as a whole contains 
significant expressive content, then the creative elements taken together 
will transform the work.261  This formulation of the Transformative Use 
Test, however, is overbroad because such an inquiry considers all the 
creative elements in the work, even if those added elements do not affect 
a celebrity’s likeness.262  Consequently, applying this overbroad test would 
distract courts from the primary focus of the Transformative Test, which 
requires courts to determine whether the factual setting of the video game 
acted upon a celebrity’s identity in such a way that it transformed it with 
some added creativity that is central to a user’s game experience.263  
                                                                                                                                     
 257 Hart, 717 F.3d at 172 (Ambro, J., dissenting) ((“The repeated focus on the use of an 
individual’s likeness in the context of the work as a whole leaves me little doubt that we 
must examine the creative work in the aggregate to determine whether it satisfies the 
Transformative Use Test and merits First Amendment protection.”) (emphasis added)). 
 258 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ((“The salient question is 
whether the entire work is transformative, and whether the transformative elements 
predominate, rather than whether an individual persona or image has been altered.”) 
(emphasis added)). 
 259 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 ((“To the extent that [the Comedy III, Winter, and Kirby] cases 
considered the broader context of the work (e.g., whether events took place in a ‘fanciful 
setting’), this inquiry was aimed at determining whether this context acted upon the 
celebrity identity in a way that transformed it or imbued it with some added creativity 
beyond providing a ‘merely trivial variation.’”) (emphasis added)); see also Comedy III, 
25 Cal. 4th at 407 ((“[A] literal depiction of a celebrity, even if accomplished with great 
skill, may still be subject to a right of publicity challenge. The inquiry is in a sense more 
quantitative than qualitative, asking whether the literal and imitative or the creative 
elements predominate in the work.”) (emphasis added)); Winter, 30 Cal. 4th at 888–89 
(quoting Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 408) ((“An artist depicting a celebrity must contribute 
something more than a merely trivial variation, but must create something recognizably 
his own, in order to qualify for legal protection.”) (quoting Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 408) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 260 Hart, 717 F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 261 Id. at 172–73. 
 262 See id. at 169 (Greenaway, J., majority) (“Decisions applying the Transformative 
Use Test invariably look to how the celebrity’s identity is used in or is altered by other 
aspects of a work[,] [and thus] [w]holly unrelated elements do not bear on this inquiry.”). 
 263 Id. at 169 n.46 (finding “the broader context of NCAA Football does not transform 
[Hart’s] likeness into anything other than a digital representation of [Hart] playing the sport 
for which he is known, while surrounded by the trappings of real-world competition.”); see 
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Accordingly, courts that consider “wholly unrelated elements” that do not 
bear on how the celebrity’s identity is used or altered may effectively 
eviscerate the legal protection afforded to the right of publicity.264 
This is especially problematic when considering the developments in 
technology that provide video game companies, such as EA Sports, the 
tools to create realistic and detail-oriented video games at low cost.265  
                                                                                                                                     
also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (concluding Keller’s likeness was not transformed based on 
the following considerations: (1) “EA is alleged to have replicated Keller’s physical 
characteristics in NCAA Football,” (2) users manipulate the characters in the performance 
of the same activity for which they are known in real life—playing football in this case,” 
and (3) [t]he context in which the activity occurs is [] similarly realistic – . . . ”realistic 
depictions of actual football stadiums in NCAA Football). 
 264 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (“Acts of blatant misappropriation would count for nothing so 
long as the larger work, on balance, contained highly creative elements in great 
abundance.”); see also Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406 (listing potentially “transformative 
or creative contributions” focused on elements or techniques that affect the celebrity 
identity, which encompassed  factual reporting, fictionalized portrayal, heavy–handed 
lampooning, and subtle social criticism,); Winter, 69 P.3d at 478–79 (noting that “[a]n artist 
depicting a celebrity must contribute something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation” 
before proceeding to discuss how the Winter brothers’ likenesses were altered directly and 
through context); No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 411 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2011) (finding [t]hat the avatars can be manipulated to perform at fanciful venues 
including outer space or to sing songs the real band would object to singing, or that the 
avatars appear in the context of a videogame that contains many other creative elements [] 
does not transform the avatars into anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s 
members doing exactly what they do as celebrities.”); Hilton, 599 F.3d at 911 (finding that 
the Hallmark card and the episode of Hilton’s reality show The Simple Life contained the 
same basic setting: “Paris Hilton, born to privilege, working as a waitress.”); ETW Corp. 
v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 960  (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., dissenting) (finding the 
right of publicity trumped the First Amendment because “it [was] clear that the prints gain 
their commercial value by exploiting the fame and celebrity status that Woods has worked 
to achieve.”); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1360 (D.N.J. 1981) 
(acknowledging that the show impersonating Elvis Presley had some informational value 
inasmuch as it preserved a live Elvis Presley act for posterity, “[t]his recognition that 
defendant’s production has some value does not diminish our conclusion that the primary 
purpose of defendant’s activity is to appropriate the commercial value of the likeness of 
Elvis Presley.”). 
 265 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (considering the proper protection afforded to the First 
Amendment in the video game context: “Acts of blatant misappropriation . . . [are] 
particularly acute in the case of media that lend themselves to easy partition such as video 
games” because “[i]t cannot be that content creators escape liability for a work that uses a 
celebrity’s unaltered identity in one section but that contains a wholly fanciful creation in 
the other, larger section.); see also Neil G. Hood, Note, The First Amendment and New 
Media: Video Games As Protected Speech and the Implications For the Right of Publicity, 
52 B.C. L. REV. 617, 625 (2011) (“As the technology advanced throughout the 1990s to 
present day, this trend of diversification and increased capabilities dramatically 
improved.”); Christian Dennie, Tebow Drops Back to Pass: Videogames Have Crossed the 
Line, But Does the Right of Publicity Protect a Student–Athlete’s Likeness When Balanced 
Against the First Amendment? 62 ARK. L. REV. 645, 646 (2009) (“Videogames depicting 
currently enrolled student–athletes are a top priority each year for many fans, alumni, and 
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Thus, under Judge Ambro’s Transformative Use Test, although EA Sports 
purposely uses an indistinguishable copy of the student-athlete’s identity 
performing the same activity for which he is widely recognized, the First 
Amendment will protect its video games so long as it adds other creative 
or transformative features to the game as a whole.  Such a result would not 
only incentivize video game developers to appropriate the economic value 
of a celebrity’s identity, but it would also create a First Amendment safe 
harbor in the context of video games. 
Moreover, Judge Thomas’s dissent in Keller argued that the 
Transformative Use Test, as set forth in Comedy III, intended a more 
“holistic” examination, considering “whether the transformative and 
creative elements of a particular work predominate over commercially 
based literal or imitative depictions.”266  Applying this holistic 
examination analysis, Judge Thomas contended that the Transformative 
Use Test should turn on a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the work as a 
whole is transformative, examining whether the creative elements 
predominate the work at issue, and (2) whether the challenger’s publicity 
rights trump the added creative elements to the contested work at issue.267  
This formulation of the Transformative Use Test, however, conflicts with 
the multiple analytical factors articulated by the California Supreme Court 
in Comedy III.268  The purpose of the Transformative Use Test, as noted 
by Judge Thomas, is not to deconstruct these five analytical factors in 
determining whether a celebrity’s right of publicity outweighs an artist’s 
right of free expression.269  Instead, the implicit purpose in Judge Mosk’s 
analysis was to provide guidance for courts in balancing the fundamental 
tension underlying the rights of free expression and publicity by flexibly 
considering the five factors.270 
                                                                                                                                     
children and have gained Electronic Arts, Inc. (EA) a stronghold on the market for 
videogames featuring NCAA student–athletes. These games have evolved substantially 
over the course of the last decade and now depict student–athletes in great detail. Due to 
the technological advances of the images and likenesses depicted in these videogames, 
student–athletes’ rights of publicity have been violated because they have not been 
compensated for the use of their images and likenesses.”). 
 266 Keller, 724 F.3d  at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 267 Id. at 1285–87. 
 268 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406–08 (noting the five-factors. It is important to 
note, however, that Judge Mosk never explicitly stated that the Transformative Use Test is 
limited to these five factors. Instead, these analytical factors provide guidance for courts in 
weighing the conflicting interests protected by the First Amendment and right of publicity). 
 269 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 270 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163 (“[T]he Transformative Use Test appears to strike the best 
balance because it provides courts with a flexible – yet uniformly applicable – analytical 
framework.”); see also McCarthy, supra note 38, § 8.72 (describing the Transformative 
218 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:175 
As a result, a proper consideration of the Transformative Use Test 
examines whether the creative elements predominate the work as a 
whole,271 but this consideration must be analyzed among the other relevant 
factors to properly balance the competing interests at stake.  Accordingly, 
Judge Thomas’s formulation of the Transformative Use Test would result 
in overprotecting the First Amendment because it fails to adequately 
consider how the context of a work acts upon, alters or transforms the 
celebrity’s likeness in the context of the disputed work.272 
In contrast, the correct formulation of the Transformative Use Test 
considers the interplay of the five analytical factors in how the work uses, 
alters, and/or transforms a celebrity’s identity in the context of other 
aspects of the work.273  The critical element to the test’s proper formulation 
is that each inquiry must examine how the creative features or elements 
affect the artistic visual depiction of a celebrity’s likeness at issue.  
Focusing on how the creative elements affect the celebrity’s identity 
ensures that the right of publicity maintains it legal force, as intended by 
Zacchini.274  Otherwise, crediting a defendant’s creative contributions that 
do not affect a celebrity’s likeness would interfere with the calibrated 
balancing that the Transformative Use Test requires.275 
Even if the commercial value of an artistic visual depiction of a 
celebrity’s image derives primarily from such identification, this does not 
end the inquiry.276  Rather, the Transformative Use Test also requires 
courts to consider the context in which the celebrity’s identity is acted 
                                                                                                                                     
Use Test as “not a ‘one test fits all’ analysis for any and all possible infringements of the 
right of publicity.”). 
 271 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 272 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169. 
 273 Id. 
 274 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (“[I]t is 
important to note that neither the public nor [the television station] will be deprived of the 
benefit of [the plaintiff’s] performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is 
appropriately recognized.”). 
 275 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 391) (emphasis added) (“We formulate instead what 
is essentially a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based 
on whether the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed 
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.”); see also Hart, 717 F.3d 
at 169 (emphasis in original) (holding that the wholly unrelated elements – that is, the 
“other creative elements of NCAA Football” – are not credited as creative elements 
pursuant to finding a transformative use because “[t]o hold otherwise could have 
deleterious consequences [to the legal protection afforded the right of publicity]” since 
“[a]cts of blatant misappropriation would count for nothing so long as the larger work, on 
balance, contained highly creative elements in great abundance.”). 
 276 No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410 (citing Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 409) (“[E]ven 
literal reproductions of celebrities can be “transformed” into expressive works based on 
the context into which the celebrity image is placed.”). 
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upon in determining the magnitude of the creative elements that affect how 
the celebrity’s identity is used or altered as it is incorporated into the 
work.277  In this regard, a work that primarily derives its profit from the 
celebrity’s identity may still constitute a transformative use.  For instance, 
parodies typically satisfy the Transformative Use Test as long as the work 
contains “significant transformative elements” relating to a celebrity’s 
identity.278  As a result, if courts examine the effect of how a defendant 
uses, alters, and/or transforms a celebrity’s identity among the other 
creative elements in the work, courts will properly weigh the conflicting 
interests. 
In sum, when determining whether a work in question is sufficiently 
transformative, courts are not required to apply all five of the Comedy III 
analytical factors.  Rather, courts should apply those factors necessary to 
resolve the conflict underlying the right of free speech and the right of 
publicity based on the sum of the “significant transformative elements” 
that affect the celebrity’s image. The Transformative Use Test therefore 
provides a flexible approach in determining whether a celebrity’s right of 
publicity outweighs an artist’s right of free expression.  Given the 
underlying framework of the Transformative Use Test, Part IV B (ii) 
discusses the proper application of this balancing test. 
ii. Proper Application of the Transformative Use Test 
While considering the five analytical factors articulated by the 
Comedy III court in the context of video games, the first step in applying 
the Transformative Use Test focuses on how the defendant’s video game 
                                                                                                                                     
 277 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 405 (“[W]hen a work contains significant 
transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, 
but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of 
publicity.”); see also Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003) (finding the 
defendant’s use was transformative because it could “readily ascertain that [the portrayals] 
are not just conventional depictions of plaintiffs but contain significant expressive content 
other than plaintiffs’ mere likenesses.”); No Doubt., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410 (citing 
Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 391) (“[E]ven literal reproductions of celebrities may be 
‘transformed’ into expressive works based on the context into which the celebrity image is 
placed.”). 
 278 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 405 (citation omitted) (discussing that because “works of 
parody . . . are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good substitutes for conventional 
depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not generally threaten markets for celebrity 
memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to protect[,] . . . First Amendment 
protection of such works outweighs whatever interest the state may have in enforcing the 
right of publicity.”). 
220 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:175 
uses the celebrity’s identity.279  Applying the first analytical factor in the 
video game context, a celebrity’s “identity” encompasses not only his or 
her likeness, but also any identifying information that would make it 
appear to an ordinary prudent person that the video game character depicts 
that celebrity.280  Although courts have held that the First Amendment 
protects publicly available information about celebrities,281 the depiction 
of a celebrity as a digital avatar in the video game context suggests a 
different analysis because the game uses virtual likenesses of actual 
celebrities.282  In other words, the recreation of a celebrity’s presence in a 
video game as a digital avatar containing public information, such as his 
or her biographical information, may still infringe that celebrity’s 
likeness.283  Thus, if a video game depicts celebrities as a digital avatar 
that merely recreates an imitation of their identities in a separate digital 
medium of expression, the video game does not sufficiently transform 
those celebrities identities.284  By contrast, if a video game adds 
                                                                                                                                     
 279 See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 164 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 
433 U.S. 562, 581 (1977)) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat use did the [defendant] make 
of the [celebrity identity]?”). 
 280 See id at 165 (defining “the term ‘identity’ to encompass not only [the celebrity’s] 
likeness, but also his biographical information. It is the combination of these two parts – 
which, when combined, identify the digital avatar as an in–game recreation of [the 
celebrity] – that must be sufficiently transformed.”). 
 281 See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a fantasy baseball product that 
uses publicly available information is protected by the First Amendment). 
 282 Hart, 717 F.3d at 165; see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1283(“It is seemingly true that 
each likeness is generated largely from publicly available data . . . but finding this fact 
dispositive would neuter the right of publicity in our digital world. Computer programmers 
with the appropriate expertise can create a realistic likeness of any celebrity using only 
publicly available data. If EA creates a virtual likeness of Tom Brady using only publicly 
available data – public images and videos of Brady – does EA have free reign to use that 
likeness in commercials without violating Brady’s right of publicity? We think not, and 
thus must reject [the dissent’s] point about the public availability of much of the data used 
given that EA produced and used actual likenesses of the athletes involved.”). 
 283 See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-1967, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10719, at *22 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (“EA’s game provides more than just the players’ names and 
statistics; it offers a depiction of the student athletes’ physical characteristics and, as noted, 
enables consumers to control the virtual players on a simulated football field[,]” which 
“goes far beyond what the court considered in C.B.C. Distribution.”), aff’d, 724 F.3d 1268 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
 284 Id. at 166 (“[T]he digital avatar does closely resemble [Hart]. Not only does the 
digital avatar match [Hart] in terms of hair color, hair style and skin tone, but the avatar’s 
accessories mimic those worn by [Hart] during his time as a Rutgers player. The 
information, as has already been noted, also accurately tracks [Hart’s] vital and 
biographical details.”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (“EA is alleged to have replicated Keller’s 
physical characteristics in NCAA Football . . . ”); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g. Inc., 122 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding “that the avatars appear in the context 
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“significant transformative elements” to celebrities’ virtual likenesses 
such that it becomes the developer’s own expression, then those 
celebrities’ identities are sufficiently transformed.285  An inquiry focusing 
on how creative elements or features affect the identities of celebrities is 
consistent with Judge Mosk’s first and second analytical factors because 
it considers whether the visual artistic image is a literal depiction of a 
particular celebrity or whether it is primarily the defendant’s own 
expression.286  Accordingly, the proper first step in applying the 
Transformative Use Test in the video game context is to ask how the video 
game creator used or altered the celebrity’s identity, focusing on both the 
celebrity’s likeness and identifying information. 
Under the second step of the Transformative Use Test, even if the 
video game uses a realistic depiction of the celebrity as a digital avatar that 
merely recreates the celebrity in a digital medium of expression, courts 
must next consider how the context of the video game incorporates the 
celebrity’s identity.287  Given that this step of the Transformative Use Test 
examines the quantitative nature of the creative elements in determining 
whether the work is primarily the video game creator’s own expression, or 
whether the creative elements merely illustrate a literal depiction of the 
celebrity, such analysis is akin to the third and fourth analytical factors 
articulated by the Comedy III court.288  When applying this step of the 
Transformative Use Test, on the one hand, if the digital avatar depicts 
celebrities performing the same activity for which they are known for in 
real life, the video game probably does not sufficiently transform those 
celebrities’ likenesses.289  On the other hand, if the video game depicts the 
                                                                                                                                     
of a video game that contains many other creative elements, does not transform the avatars 
into anything other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly what they 
do as celebrities.”). 
 285 See Kirby, Cal. App. 4th at 59 (holding “Ulala is more than a mere likeness or literal 
depiction of Kirby,” noting Ulala’s “extremely tall, slender computer-generated physique,” 
her “hairstyle and primary costume,” her dance moves, and her role as “a space-age reporter 
in the 25th century,” all of which were “unlike any public depiction of Kirby.”). 
 286 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406 (“[W]hether the celebrity likeness is one of the 
‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized . . . . [W]hether a product 
containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”). 
 287 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (“[L]ooking at how [the celebrity’s] identity is 
‘incorporated into and transformed by’ [the video game].”). 
 288 See Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 407 (“[W]hether the literal and imitative or the 
creative elements predominate in the work . . . [D]oes the marketability and economic value 
of the challenged work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted?”). 
 289 See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (“The digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan 
Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations of college football 
stadiums, filled with all the trappings of a college football game. This is not transformative; 
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celebrity in a setting that is not similar to that in which the celebrity is 
known, courts will probably find the context acted upon the celebrity in a 
way that sufficiently transformed the celebrity’s identity.290  Thus, the 
second step of the Transformative Use Test turns on the magnitude of how 
the celebrity’s identity is used or altered as it is incorporated in the video 
game. 
The application of the third and final step depends on whether the 
user’s ability to alter the celebrity’s avatar constitutes a transformative 
use.291  In other words, can video game developers satisfy the 
Transformative Use Test by creating a feature that allows the video game 
user to alter the celebrity’s digital avatar appearance.292  Consistent with 
the fifth analytical factor of the Transformative Use Test, the focus of this 
inquiry turns on whether the interactive feature is a mere pretext by video 
game developers to commercially exploit celebrities’ fame or whether the 
interactive features transform those celebrities’ images so it becomes 
video game developers own creative expression.293  Video game 
developers argue that the user’s ability to alter the celebrity’s avatar 
constitutes a creative element protected by the First Amendment because 
this feature acts in conjunction with the other creative features in the game.  
Thus, the alteration feature constitutes “one of the ‘raw materials’ from 
                                                                                                                                     
the various digitized sights and sounds in the video game do not alter or transform the 
[Hart’s] identity in a significant way.”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (citation omitted)(“Keller 
is represented as what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State and Nebraska, and 
the game’s setting is identical to where the public found [Keller] during his collegiate 
career: on the football field.”); No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410–11 (“[N]o matter what 
else occurs in the game during the depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the avatars perform 
rock songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and maintains its fame.”). 
 290 See Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 890, 892 (Cal. 2003) (“To the extent the 
drawings of the Autumn brothers resemble plaintiffs at all, they are distorted for purposes 
of lampoon, parody, or caricature[,]” and thus, “DC Comics depicting fanciful, creative 
characters, not pictures of the Winter brothers.”).; Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 59 (“[T]he 
the setting for the game that features Ulala – as a space-age reporter in the 25th century – 
is unlike any public depiction of Kirby”. 
 291 Compare Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (finding “a third avatar-specific element is also 
present: the users’ ability to alter the avatar’s appearance.”), with No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 410 (noting that the digital avatars representing No Doubt were “at all times 
immutable images of the real celebrity musicians”). 
 292 See Hart, 717 F.3d at 167 (determining “to what extent the ability to alter a digital 
avatar represents a transformative use of [Hart’s] identity” constitutes a transformative 
use”). 
 293 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 408 (“[W]hen an artist’s skill and talent is manifestly 
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to 
commercially exploit his or her fame, then the artist’s right of free expression is outweighed 
by the right of publicity.”). 
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which an original work is synthesized . . . [rather than] the very sum and 
substance of the work in question.”294 
The proper application of the Transformative Use Test, however, 
does not hold interactivity as an end onto itself.  Rather, the balancing 
inquiry requires courts to determine whether the interests protected by the 
right of publicity are sufficient to overcome the already-existing First 
Amendment protections.295  As Zacchini illustrated in the context of a 
newscast broadcasting, the right of publicity can trump another’s First 
Amendment interest in situations where the dissemination of such 
expression receives strong First Amendment protection.296  If courts found 
an interactive feature allowing a user to alter a digital avatar as an end onto 
itself and thus, satisfying the Transformative Use Test, the result would 
create a safe harbor that would destroy the legal protection afforded to 
publicity rights.297  Consequently, video game developers would not bear 
any legal liability for diluting as much commercial value of celebrities’ 
likenesses as they desire.298  The Transformative Use Test, therefore, 
cannot hold that the First Amendment protects a video game by merely 
including a particular interactive feature, such as the users’ ability to alter 
the digital avatar’s appearance.299 
Instead, in determining whether the degree of interactivity to alter a 
digital avatar’s appearance sufficiently transforms that celebrity’s 
                                                                                                                                     
 294 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166–69; see also Keller, 724 F.3d at 1277 (“EA suggests that the 
fact that NCAA Football users can alter the characteristics of the avatars in the game is 
significant.”); Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406. 
 295 Hart, 717 F.3d at 167; see also id. at 170 n.47 (summarizing the Transformative Use 
Test’s proper inquiry in balancing the First Amendment and the right of publicity: “[The 
Third Circuit’s] inquiry looked to whether other interests may surmount the First 
Amendment protection – as they can surmount protections for other modes of expression. 
In finding that NCAA Football failed to satisfy the Transformative Use Test, [the Third 
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likeness, courts must determine, as a threshold matter in applying the third 
step, whether the celebrity’s unaltered likeness or default position is an 
essential element to the user’s game experience.300  If the celebrity’s 
unaltered likeness is a critical element to the user’s game experience, as 
was the case in Hart and Keller because the video games replicated both 
college football players performing the same activity for which they were 
known in real life,301 a court should not credit the user’s ability to alter the 
digital avatar as a “significant transformative element,” which would in 
turn support a finding of a transformative use.302 
Crediting users’ ability to alter the appearances of digital avatars as 
a transformative element would be illogical when the realistic depiction of 
the “unaltered likeness is central to the core of the game experience” 
because such users will be discouraged from using this interactive 
feature.303  For instance, because the realistic depictions of Hart and 
Keller’s default appearances in NCAA Football were critical elements to 
users’ game experience, users would be disinclined to alter their likenesses 
because such realism “permit[s] users to recreate the setting of a bitter 
defeat and, in effect, achieve some cathartic readjustment of history.”304  
Therefore, the expressive value of allowing users to alter the players’ 
digital avatars in games such as NCAA Football is minimal, which 
indicates that such feature fails to add “something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”305 
In contrast, if the celebrity’s unaltered likeness is not an essential 
element to the users game experience, an interactive feature that allows 
users to alter the digital avatar’s appearance shall be credited as “one of 
the ‘raw materials’ from which the broader game is constructed.”306  As 
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indicated in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., for example, if a video game 
depicts a space-age reporter in the 25th century, which is unlike a public 
depiction of a popular singer, such alleged use constitutes a significant 
creative element.307 
Thus, in the video game context, a court must make a threshold 
determination as to whether the celebrity’s unaltered or default digital 
avatar “is central to the core of the game experience”  when either crediting 
or discrediting the user’s ability to alter the avatar’s appearance as a 
transformative element.308  In other words, if the enjoyment of the game 
remains “in the users’ ability to play ‘as, or alongside’ their preferred 
players or team,”309 any modification to the avatar will not constitute a 
“significant transformative element” that supports a transformative use 
defense.  However, this determination of whether or not the celebrity’s 
unaltered appearance is an essential element to a user’s game experience 
should not be dispositive.  Instead, the ability to alter a digital avatar is 
merely another factor to consider in resolving the tension between the right 
of publicity and the First Amendment.310 
Therefore, this threshold determination should turn on whether users, 
in fact, desire the ability to alter a celebrity’s digital avatar.  In making this 
determination, courts should survey a sufficient sample of users to 
establish whether the celebrity’s unaltered appearance is an essential 
element to that particular video game.  If the quantity of users using the 
interactive feature to alter a celebrity’s avatar is statistically insignificant 
or insubstantial, courts will find that celebrity’s unaltered likeness is an 
essential element to a user’s game experience.  In such instances, courts 
will not credit the interactive feature as a “significant creative element.”  
Statistically, if, however, a substantial quantity of users use the interactive 
feature, then a court should find that celebrity’s unaltered likeness is not 
an essential element. Under these circumstances, courts will credit such an 
alteration feature as a “significant creative element,” which thereby 
supports a finding of a transformative use. Accordingly, in applying the 
final step of the Transformative Use Test, courts should ask whether the 
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type and extent of the video game’s interactivity sufficiently transforms 
the celebrity’s likeness to the extent the celebrity’s appearance is not 
essential to the core of the users’ game experience.311 
To summarize, the proper application of the Transformative Use Test 
in the video game context requires courts to first consider how the 
defendant’s video game uses the celebrity’s identity.  After focusing on 
the use of the celebrity’s identity, including his or her appearance and other 
relevant information associated with the celebrity, courts should then 
consider how the context of the video game incorporates the celebrity’s 
identity.  Finally, if a video game contains an interactive feature, a court 
must examine whether the type and degree of interactivity that affects the 
celebrity’s likeness is an essential element to users’ game experience.  
Courts must examine all three steps independently, while also ignoring 
“wholly unrelated elements” that fail to act upon or affect the celebrity’s 
identity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As intellectual property rights (including the right of publicity) have 
expanded, defining the scope of protected speech under the First 
Amendment has become very complex.  Courts have used a variety of 
balancing tests, including an ad-hoc approach, the Predominant Use Test, 
the trademark-based Rogers Test, and the copyright-based Transformative 
Use Test, in weighing these competing interests. 
Both the Third and Ninth Circuit addressed the conflict between the 
right of publicity and the First Amendment when two former college 
football players sought legal relief from EA Sports for misappropriating 
their likeness without their consent in EA Sports’s NCAA Football video 
games series.  In determining the proper analytical framework for 
balancing the former college football players’ right of publicity against EA 
Sports’s right to free speech, both circuits properly agreed that the 
Transformative Use Test provided the best balancing test. 
In applying the Transformative Use Test, both circuits noted how 
technological innovation allowed video game companies to develop 
realistic games that included depictions that virtually resembled the former 
student-athletes.  Consequently, although video games may contain 
“significant creative elements” as a whole, these creative features are 
insufficient by themselves to constitute the kinds of expressive speech that 
the First Amendment intended to protect.  Instead, the Transformative Use 
Test requires video game developers to transform the identity or likeness 
of celebrities depicted within the context of the video game.  Thus, the 
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focus of applying the Transformative Use Test remains to be on how other 
aspects of the game use the identity or likeness of the celebrity. 
If the application of the Transformative Use Test considers “wholly 
unrelated elements” that are not essential to users’ game experience, the 
right of publicity would no longer have any legal effect in the video game 
context.  Since this result would give video game developers a license to 
misappropriate a valuable property right, it is imperative that future courts 
applying the Transformative Use Test in the context of video games to 
disregard creative elements that are not central to the core of the game 
experience; thus fail to act upon the identity of the celebrity. 
The majority decisions in Hart and Keller came to the correct 
conclusion in holding that EA Sports’s NCAA Football video game series 
did not sufficiently transform the particular student-athletes’ likenesses 
because the game depicted these former college football players’ 
identically performing the same activity for which they were recognized 
in real life.  Because the creative elements depicted in EA Sports’s video 
games involved elements that failed to transform the identities of the 
players and were not essential to users’ game experience, the Third and 
Ninth Circuit’s correctly disregarded such elements.  Accordingly, the 
Third and Ninth Circuit decisions serve as valuable precedent for resolving 
the conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment in the 
video game context by providing greater clarity in balancing these 
competing interests that has caused great debate and flux since its 
inception in Zacchini. 
 
